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THE UNIVERSAL DOUBT IN THE LIGHT OF DESCARTES'S CONCEPTION OF TRUTH

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Although Descartes builds his philosophy on clear and distinct ideas, and in spite of his frequent appeal to common sense, there is hardly an aspect of his thought on which full agreement has been reached. And of no phase of his philosophy can this observation be made with greater justification than of his theory of the doubt.

It is generally considered as beyond dispute that Descartes never suffered the anguish of a Pascal or a St. Augustine in his quest for certitude, for the mystery of reality left him seemingly unperturbed. Even the untrustworthiness of the sense, of which he was so keenly aware, failed to disturb the tranquillity of his mind. Long before he delved into metaphysics, his conception of the physical universe had already proved its fertility in the form of revolutionary discoveries in the practical sciences. Most interpreters also agree that Descartes's doubt differs from that of the skeptic, at least in its end or purpose, and in this they can refer to Descartes's own explicit statement.

Not that indeed I imitated the sceptics, who only doubt for the sake of doubting, and pretend to be always uncertain; for, on the contrary, my design was only to provide myself with good ground for assurance, and to reject the quicksand and mud in order to find the rock or clay.¹

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¹ *Discourse on Method*, Part III; Vol. I of *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (2 vols.; Cambridge: University Press, 1931-34), p. 99. Permission to quote from this work has kindly been granted by the publisher. "Non que j'imitasse pour cela les sceptiques, que ne doutent que pour douter, et effectent d'être toujours irrésolus; car, au contraire, tout mon dessein ne tendait qu'à m'assurer, et à rejeter la terre mouvante et la sable pour trouver le roc ou l'argile" (*Discours de la Méthode*, Partie III; Vol. I of *Oeuvres de Descartes*, publiées par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery [13 vols.; Paris: Cerf, 1897-1913], p. 29).

On the precise nature and the limits of the doubt, however, the storm of the controversy rages unabated.

The lack of agreement among the commentators springs from the seemingly equivocal character of the texts. Some of these present the doubt as a mere device, while others depict it as sincere and genuine.

That the doubt cannot be taken lightly seems to be demanded by its nature and by the place it occupies at the beginning of Descartes's philosophy. It is true, Descartes disclaims any kinship with the skeptics; but in spite of the difference in attitude and outlook, his doubt must be no less effectual than that of the skeptics. The removal of the shifting sand and the discovery of the rock is one and the same operation; and if the loose earth is not thoroughly disposed of, the edifice will not rest on secure ground. The *reasons* for the doubt, therefore, *cannot be fictitious*; and of the fact that they are not, Descartes seems to assure us when he says that he has accomplished his ends "in trying to discover the error or uncertainty of the propositions which I examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and assured reasonings."²

Even after the introduction of the *malin génie* has made it extraordinary and hyperbolic, as well as universal, the doubt is still said to spring from strong and well-considered reasons.

. . . it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author to whom they assign my origin the less powerful. To these reasons I certainly have nothing to reply, but at the end I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that *not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered* . . .³

² *Discourse*, III (Haldane and Ross, I, 99). ". . . tachant à découvrir la fausseté ou l'incertitude des propositions que j'examinois, non par de foibles conjectures, mais par des raisonnements clairs et assurés . . ." (*Discours*, III [Adam et Tannery, VI, 29]).

³ *Meditations on First Philosophy*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 147-48). ". . . d'autant moins puissant sera l'auteur qu'ils attribueront à mon origine, d'autant plus sera-t-il probable que je suis tellement imparfait que je me trompe toujours. Ausquelles raisons je n'ai certes rien à répondre, mais je suis contraint d'avouer que, de toutes les opinions que j'avais autrefois reçues en ma créance pour véritables, il n'y a pas une de laquelle je ne puisse maintenant douter, *non par aucune inconsideration ou legèreté, mais pour des raisons très fortes et murement considérées* . . ." (*Meditations Touchant la Première Philosophie*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 171]). [Italics mine.] ". . . quo minus potentem originis meae authorem assignabunt, eo probabilius erit me tam imperfectum esse ut semper fallar. Quibus sane argumentis non habeo quod

At the beginning of the first meditation, Descartes informs us of the *necessity* of the doubt as the initial step in philosophy. Because of the credulity of his younger years, many false beliefs have crept into his views, and whatever knowledge may have been constructed on such an insecure basis could have given him no more assurance of truth than those false beliefs themselves. If he was to succeed in his venture, it became unavoidable that he should cast out all former opinions and start anew.

. . . I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences.⁴

In the "Reply to the Second Set of Objections," Descartes admits that to rehash the old views of the skeptics and academicians is a rather odious task. Nevertheless, because of the *wholesomeness of the doubt* and its ability to cleanse the mind of useless accretions, he feels obliged to devote an entire meditation to it; and he urges the reader to read and reread the meditation for weeks, if not for months.⁵

That Descartes considered the doubt as *highly effective* is indicated by a letter to Mersenne, who had pointed out that in the *Discours* the conception of the soul as distinct from the body should have been developed more in detail. Descartes replies that to treat the matter

respondeam, sed tandem cogor fateri nihil esse ex iis quae olim vera putabam, de quo non liceat dubitare, idque non per inconsiderantiam vel levitatem, sed propter validas et meditata rationes . . . (*ibid.*, VII, 21-22).

⁴ *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 144). ". . . de façon qu'il me fallait entreprendre sérieusement une fois en ma vie de me défaire de toutes les opinions que j'avais reçues jusques alors en ma créance, et commencer tout de nouveau dès les fondements, si je voulais établir quelque chose de ferme et de constant dans les sciences" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 13]). ". . . omnia semel in vita esse evertenda, atque a primis fundamentis denuo inchoandum, si quid aliquando firmum et mansurum cupiam in scientiis stabilire" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, VII, 17]).

⁵ "C'est pourquoi, ne sachant rien de plus utile pour parvenir à une ferme et assurée connaissance des choses, que si, auparavant que de rien établir, on s'accoutume à douter de tout et principalement des choses corporelles, encore que j'eusse vu il y a longtemps plusieurs livres écrits par les sceptiques et académiciens touchant cette matière, et que ce ne fut pas sans quelque dégoût que je ramâchais une viande si commune je n'ai pu toutefois me dispenser de lui donner une Méditation tout entière; et je voudrais que les lecteurs n'emploient pas seulement le peu de temps qu'il faut pour la lire, mais quelques mois, ou du moins quelques semaines, à considérer les choses dont elle traite, auparavant que de passer outre; car ainsi je ne doute point qu'il ne fissent bien mieux leur profit de la lecture du reste" (*Secondes Réponses* [Adam et Tannery, IX, 103]).

properly it would have been necessary to push the doubt further than he thought it advisable in a treatise addressed to the unlearned. For he feared that the less keen-minded among his readers might be all too eager to embrace the doubts and scruples, and then find themselves incapable of grasping the reasons which he would have to put forth to overcome the doubt.⁶

While the doubt thus appears genuine, necessary, and effective, rather different characteristics can easily be gleaned from other texts.

The beginning of the fourth part of *Discours de la Méthode*, for instance, reveals the doubt as a methodical device which is employed to eradicate deep-seated intellectual habits, as a means of counteracting the practice as we are compelled to follow in our everyday lives of accepting as indubitable even those opinions which we know to be uncertain.

For a long time I had remarked that it is sometimes requisite in common life to follow opinions which one knows to be most uncertain, exactly as though they were indisputable, as has been said above. But because in this case I wished to give myself entirely to the search after Truth, *I thought that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt*, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain.⁷

To achieve the golden mean in our intellectual activity, it may be necessary to cure one extreme habit by another.

This would cause no more surprise to a Philosopher than that at some time a stick which had been straightened out

⁶ "Mais je ne pouvais mieux traiter cette matière, qu'en expliquant amplement la fausseté ou l'incertitude qui se trouve en tous les jugements qui dépendent du sens ou de l'imagination afin de montrer ensuite quels sont ceux qui ne dépendent que de l'entendement pur, et combien ils sont évidents et certains. Ce que j'ai omis tout à dessein, et par considération, et principalement à cause que j'ai écrit en langue vulgaire, de peur que les esprits faibles venant à embrasser d'abord avidement les doutes et scruples qu'il m'eût fallu proposer, ne pussent après comprendre en même façon les raisons par lesquelles j'eusse taché de les ôter, et ainsi que je les eusse engagés dans un mauvais pas, sans peut-être les en tirer" (*Correspondance*, LXX [Adam et Tannery, I, 350]).

⁷ *Discourse*, IV (Haldane and Ross, I, 100-1). "J'avais dès longtemps remarqué que, pour les moeurs, il est besoin quelquefois de suivre des opinions qu'on sait être fort incertaines, tout de même que si elles étaient indubitables, ainsi qu'il a été dit ci-dessus; mais, pour ce qu'alors je désirais vaquer seulement à la recherche de la vérité, je pensai qu'il fallait que je fisse tout le contraire, et que je rejetasse, comme absolument faux, tout ce en quoi je pourrais imaginer le moindre doute, afin de voir s'il ne resterait point, après cela, quelque chose en ma créance, qui fut entièrement indubitable" (*Discours*, IV [Adam et Tannery, VI, 311]). [Italics mine.]

should be similarly bent back again into the opposite, i.e. crooked, shape. For he knows that falsities are often assumed instead of truths for the purpose of throwing light on the truth . . .⁸

The same thought appears toward the end of the first meditation.

. . . nor will I ever lose the habit of deferring to them or of placing my confidence in them, so long as I consider them as they really are, i.e. opinions in some measure doubtful, as I have just shown, and at the same time highly probable, so that there is much more reason to believe in than to deny them. That is why I consider that I shall not be acting amiss, if, *taking of set purpose a contrary belief, I allow myself to be deceived*, and for a certain time pretend that all these opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at last, having thus balanced my former prejudices with my latter [so that they cannot divert my opinions more to one side than to the other], my judgment will no longer be dominated by bad usage or turned away from the right knowledge of the truth.⁹

In addition, Descartes here admits that the doubt is not based on the nature of the case or on an actual state of mind. It is obvious that in doubting some things to the extent of rejecting them as false, he does not consider them as they really are, that is, only *somewhat* doubtful,

⁸ *The Author's Reply to the Fifth Set of Objections* (Haldane and Ross, II, 205-6). "Nec magis miraretur Philosophus istius modi suppositionem, quam quod aliquando, ut baculum qui curvus est rectum reddamus, illum in contrarium partem recurvemus. Novit enim saepe falsa pro veris utiliter sic assumi ad veritatem illustrandum . . ." (*Quintae Responsiones* [Adam et Tannery, VII, 349]).

⁹ *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 148). "Et je ne me désaccountumerai jamais d'y acquiescer, et de prendre confiance en elles, tant que je les considérerai telles quelles sont en effet, c'est à savior en quelque façon douteuses, comme je viens de montrer, et toutefois forte probables, en sortes que l'on a beaucoup plus de raison de les croire que de les nier. C'est pourquoi je pense que j'en serai plus prudemment, si, *prenant un parti contraire*, j'employe tous mes soins à *me tromper moi-même*, feignant que toutes ces pensées sont fausses et imaginaires; jusques à ce qu'ayant tellement balancé mes préjugés, qu'ils ne puissent faire pancher mon avis plus d'un côté que d'un autre, mon jugement ne soit plus désormais maîtrisé par de mauvais usages et détourné du droit chemin qui le peut conduire à la connaissance de la vérité" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 17]). ". . . nec unquam iis assentiri et confidere desuescam quamdiu tales esse supponam quales sunt revera, nempe aliquo quidem modo dubias, ut jam jam ostensum est, sed nihilominus valde probabiles, et quas multo magis rationi consentaneum sit credere quam negare. Quapropter, ut opinor, non male agam, si, voluntate plane in contrarium versa, me ipsum fallam, illasque aliquandiu omnino falsas imaginariasque esse fingam, donec tandem, velut aequatis utrimque praejudiciorum ponderibus, nulla amplius prava consuetudo iudicium meum a recta rerum perceptione detorqueat" (*ibid.*, VII, 22). [Italics mine.]

but yet *highly probable*. Were he to consider these things in their true nature, the doubt, at least in Descartes's extremely radical form, would be halted, for it would then be more reasonable to affirm than to deny them.

In fact, to Hobbes, who is quite willing to regard the doubt elaborated in the first meditation as justified, Descartes replies in the answer to the third set of objections:

The reasons for doubt here admitted as true by this Philosopher were propounded by me only as possessing verisimilitude . . .¹⁰

Expressions such as these give the doubt almost the appearance of an arbitrary act of the will.

. . . to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could *imagine the least ground of doubt* . . . I *wished* to suppose . . . I *resolved* to assume . . .¹¹ . . . I allow myself to be deceived, and for a certain time *pretend* that all these opinions are entirely false and imaginary . . .¹²

And finally, the artificial character of the doubt is brought to light by a passage contained in the closing words of the synopsis of the meditations:

. . . that there is in truth a world, that men possess bodies, and other such things . . . never have been doubted by anyone of sense . . .¹³

Bewildered by so much evidence for either of two mutually exclusive interpretations, we ask ourselves: Is the Cartesian doubt an intellectually

¹⁰ *Objections III with Replies*, (Haldane and Ross, II, 60). "Les raisons de douter qui sont ici reçues pour vraies par ce philosophe, n'ont été proposées par moi que comme vraisemblables . . ." (*Troisièmes Objections avec les Réponses* [Adam et Tannery, IX, 133]).

¹¹ *Discourse*, IV (Haldane and Ross, I, 101). ". . . que je rejetasse, comme absolument faux, tout ce en quoi je pourrais *imaginer le moindre doute* . . . je *voulus* supposer . . . je me *resolus* de feindre . . ." (*Discours*, IV [Adam et Tannery, VI, 31]). [Italics mine.]

¹² *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 148). ". . . j'employe tous mes soins à me tromper moi-même, *feignant* que toutes ces pensées sont fausses et imaginaires . . ." (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 17]). "Quapropter, ut opinor, non male agam, si, voluntate plane in contrarium versa, me ipsum fallam, illasque aliquandiu omnino falsas imaginariasque esse fingam . . ." (*ibid.*, VII, 22). [Italics mine.]

¹³ *Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations* (Haldane and Ross, I, 142-43). ". . . qu'il y a un monde, que les hommes ont des corps, et d'autres choses semblables . . . n'ont jamais été mises en doute par aucun homme de bon sens . . ." (*Abrégé des Six Meditations Suivantes* [Adam et Tannery, IX, 12]). ". . . revera esse aliquem mundum, et homines habere corpora, et similia, de quibus nemo unquam sanæ mentis serio dubitavit . . ." (*ibid.*, VII, 16).

compelling doubt, or is it an act of the will? Is it sincere and effective, or is it a mere artifice, a methodological device to achieve a certain end? Is the *malin génie* the personification of the possibility of an irrational universe confronting reason and thus rooted in the nature of reality? Or is it a product of the will and the imagination, drawn out of nothingness, to which it returns as soon as the will ceases to desire it?

The answer we are inclined to give to these questions will determine whether we are to align ourselves with one or the other of three groups of interpreters which Olgiati lists in his recent work on Descartes.¹⁴

First, there are those for whom the doubt, to use the word of L. Liard, is merely a *parti-pris de la volonté*,¹⁵ or, in the terms of V. Brochard, a means rather than an end, provisional rather than final.¹⁶ In the same group we should perhaps include Henri Gouhier, who regards the *malin génie* as a device *aussi artificielle qu'artificieuse*.¹⁷ Olgiati himself finds his proper place among these interpreters. In his opinion, Descartes's real point of departure is not the doubt, but a conception of reality on the level of rationalistic phenomenism, i.e., the clear and distinct ideas in which truth and being, essence and existence, are one, and which are therefore inaccessible to the doubt.

To the second group, Olgiati assigns Cardinal Mercier¹⁸ and Hamelin,¹⁹ who defend the view that Descartes entertained a genuine, thoroughgoing doubt. As a member of this group we might add A. Boyce Gibson who holds that "the skeptical procedure of Descartes is entirely honest"²⁰ and that "intuition is not exempt from the operation of the methodical doubt."²¹

Finally, as the representative of a third group, Olgiati mentions Gilson who, so to speak, cuts the Gordian knot by attributing to Descartes a twofold doubt, the doubt of the skeptic in matters which actually appear doubtful to him, and a volitional doubt, based on the will and the imagination, in matters which he does not really doubt.²²

¹⁴ Francesco Olgiati, *La Filosofia di Descartes* (Milano, 1939), pp. 221-23.

¹⁵ L. Liard, *Descartes* (Paris: Baillière, 1882), p. 143.

¹⁶ V. Brochard, *De la Méthode de Descartes* (Paris, 1888), p. 105.

¹⁷ Henri Gouhier, "Le malin génie dans l'itinéraire cartésien," *Revue de Philosophie* (Janvier, 1937), p. 17.

¹⁸ Cardinal Désiré Mercier, *Critériologie générale* (Louvain, 1906), pp. 66 ff.

¹⁹ O. Hamelin, *Le Système de Descartes* (Paris: Alcan, 1921), pp. 111-19.

²⁰ A. Boyce Gibson, *The Philosophy of Descartes* (London: Methuen & Co., 1932), p. 81.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

²² "Descartes doute en sceptique de ce qui lui semble réellement douteux, et il étend volontairement ce scepticisme à ce dont il ne doute pas réellement, mais dont il conçoit la possibilité abstraite de douter pour les raisons qu'il imagine"

To take a one-sided stand, such as the interpreters of the first two groups, clearly does not do justice to Descartes's explicit statements. Gilson's conception of a twofold doubt appears to cover the texts, at least to a certain extent, but does it really solve the problem?

If Descartes's metaphysics does not permit him seriously to doubt certain truths, if he merely pretends to doubt and his doubt is a feint, then the victory of the *cogito* over the denials of the skeptics is a sham. His philosophy does not stand on solid ground and the *cogito* is not its first principle. The doubt, to play the part which Descartes has assigned to it, must be universal and must be a genuine doubt.

However, if it is to be a thoroughgoing doubt, it can hardly spare the clear and distinct ideas; otherwise, the very building blocks of Descartes's philosophy would be received uncritically. And if the clear and distinct ideas, if intuitive knowledge has felt its corrosive effects, would not the faculties of knowledge themselves be infested? But once the faculties of knowledge have become untrustworthy, our mind is stopped dead in its tracks. For how could we again call upon these same faculties to help us overcome the doubt and establish the first principle of philosophy?

The problem is serious and the editors of the latest edition of Ueberweg's *Grundriss* showed great prudence when they refused to attempt a facile solution but were content to point out that the Cartesian doubt is both a *methodischer Kunstgriff* and the *Überwindung der skeptischen Strömungen*, leaving it to the ingenuity of the reader to try to reconcile these two apparently incompatible notions.²³

As we have seen, interpretations of the Cartesian doubt are almost endless, and simply to add another one would, in truth, be carrying coal to Newcastle. But just because there are so many different views, often based on identical texts, the possibility suggests itself that these commentators bring with them their own particular brand of philosophy which, when cast over Descartes's doubt, gives it that multifarious appearance.

Another attempt could perhaps be justified by an appeal, not only to the texts, but to a more fundamental principle. It should be obvious that the problem of the doubt cannot be divorced from Descartes's conception of truth, of the nature of ideas, and the function of the will

(Étienne Gilson, *René Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, Texte et Commentaire* (Paris, 1925), p. 286.

²³ Friedrich Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Dritter Teil, *Die Philosophie der Neuzeit bis zum Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*, völlig neuarbeitet von Dr. Max Frischeisen-Köhler und Dr. Welly Moog (12te Auflage; Berlin: Mittler, 1924), p. 221.

in the act of cognition. This divorce, however, has been a common practice. We shall use Hamelin's and Mercier's interpretation to show what happens to the doubt if we disregard the will which plays such an important role in all phases of Descartes's philosophy. Lantrua's, in addition, will exemplify the futility of trying to introduce the universal doubt from the point of view of Thomistic philosophy. Liard and Gouhier, finally, will illustrate the use of the will, which, however, in their particular application is not wholly successful because it is not firmly enough rooted in the fundamental principles of Descartes's philosophy.

This perhaps somewhat awkward approach, which, because of the present state of the question, seems unavoidable, is not without advantages, however, if only because it will give us an opportunity to benefit by the mistakes of others and learn of the pitfalls which at all costs we must strive to avoid. Furthermore, it will enable us to measure the success of our interpretation not only by its conformity with the texts, but also by the way in which it is able to uncover the shortcomings of the others. In criticizing these various views we shall, at the same time, have to give expression to our own opinion, at least in its negative aspects, so that the positive side of our interpretation can be stated in rather brief terms at the end.

Hamelin, for our purposes, is particularly interesting. Gifted as he is with a great insight into Descartes's thought, he is also burdened with an idealistic outlook which he never tires of trying to impose on our philosopher. The pictures which he develops of certain phases of Descartes's philosophy are therefore most revealing and yet appear slightly out of focus, thus irritating the reader and at the same time stimulating him and urging him on to further research and investigation.

According to Hamelin, the initial doubt is *necessary*, for nothing is certain in metaphysics. The endless disputations and disagreements among the philosophers have impressed Descartes with that fact. The doubt is also *radical*, for Descartes starts without any criterion of truth whatsoever. It is an *intellectual* doubt; the function attributed to the will is the traditional one; the will sets the doubt in motion as any other intellectual activity.²⁴ The doubt is finally arrested by a fact, not because this fact satisfies a standard of truth, but because as a fact it is inaccessible to the doubt.

²⁴ "Ce n'est pas un parti-pris de résister à l'évidence: c'est un parti-pris de douter jusqu'à ce que la raison impose la cessation du doute" (Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 110, n. 1).

While necessary and radical, Hamelin continues, the doubt is not without limitation. Exempt from the doubt are the "notions . . . which are known without any affirmation or denial."²⁵ This, we are told, is regrettable and represents a great defect in Descartes's philosophy. Since all forms of reasoning, the judgments, and even the *vincula*, are ultimately reduced to intuitively perceived ideas, Descartes, by exempting the ideas from the doubt, accepts uncritically the very basis of his philosophy.²⁶

When dealing with the faculties of knowledge, Hamelin is careful to show that they are immune against a doubt which would make them irreparably useless. However, thought is at times influenced by prejudice and other outside circumstances. This external compulsion leads to the supposition of an irrational universe confronting thought. The *malin génie* is but the personification of the violence which this irrationality might inflict upon the mind. Because it is external, it does not affect the nature of the intelligence. To ward off its evil influence, the intelligence calls on the will which provides protection by its refusal to judge.²⁷

On the credit side of Hamelin's interpretation we have a doubt which, though radical, leaves the faculties of knowledge untouched. On the debit side, there is a dangerous limitation of the doubt, inasmuch as the ideas are not subjected to criticism. The *malin génie* is grounded in reality, but, after the cessation of the doubt, Descartes is said to have made no effort to re-establish the rationality of the world. The will receives the bare minimum of activity; its function is largely negative; it lies in its capacity to refuse judgment.

Mercier, like Hamelin, takes Descartes's doubt seriously. Mercier believes that Descartes considered his doubt as fictitious and that he intended it merely as a weapon against skepticism. In his opinion, however, the logical implications of the doubt are such that, had

²⁵ *Letter from M. Descartes to M. Clerselier* (Haldane and Ross, II, 127). " . . . notions . . . qui se connaissent sans aucune affirmation ou negation" (*Sur les Cinquièmes Objections* [Adam et Tannery, IX, 206]).

²⁶ "S'il en est ainsi, la base ultime de tout le système est dans les idées, et c'est sur elles principalement que le doute aurait dû porter" (Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 113).

²⁷ "L'hypothèse du malin génie équivaut si peu à celle d'une fausseté essentielle de l'intelligence qu'elle signifie précisément qu'une pression externe menace sans cesse l'intelligence. L'hypothèse ne peut se concevoir et s'exprimer que si l'on commence par admettre qu'il y a une intelligence à influencer du dehors. Cette intelligence appelle à son aide la volonté, et celle-ci maintient les droits de l'intelligence en refusant de juger" (*ibid.*, p. 119).

Descartes been willing to accept them, he would have fallen into the worst kind of skepticism himself.

If Hamelin attributes to the will a very minor role, Mercier disregards it almost altogether. As a result he rejects the customary distinction between the methodical doubt and the real doubt, according to which the former depends on the will, while the latter does not. The will, says Mercier, is extrinsic to the intelligence, and since we are concerned with intellectual certainty, the difference between the real and the methodical doubt should be sought in the intelligence alone.

The real doubt Mercier regards as a simple state of the soul; it is the absence of adherence to a given proposition. The methodical doubt, on the other hand, is said to be based on a complex state of doubt and certitude. Such a complex state of mind prevails, for instance, when, preparatory to the demonstration of a Euclidean theorem, we doubt its validity. As a matter of fact, we know that the theorem is true, perhaps on the basis of authority or because we have previously performed the demonstration which we now vaguely remember. What we do not know are the intrinsic reasons for the truth or the detailed steps of the demonstration. The doubt thus conceived is not essentially an act of the will. The will contributes to the state of uncertainty, not in the sense of causing the doubt, but by withdrawing the attention from the latent and implicit knowledge and focusing it on the absence of the explicit understanding of the logical connections involved. In this manner, the doubt, while methodical, is still a real and intellectual doubt, based as it is on an actual state of mind.²⁸

From the point of view of Descartes, it is, of course, not true to say that the will is extrinsic to the doubt. Mercier does not realize, or does not concern himself with, the fact that in Descartes's philosophy the judgment is a function of the will and that the will, therefore, is essential to the doubt as to the full development of a cognitive act. Nevertheless, even for Descartes, it would seem, the doubt cannot be altogether arbitrary. As he shows in connection with the problem of error, the will, being absolutely free, is able to transgress the bounds set by the understanding. But in disregarding the understanding, the will exposes itself to error. Similarly, a doubt which springs solely from the will is a blind doubt and therefore not altogether satisfactory. Before Descartes can legitimately cast suspicion on what are usually considered the most evident mathematical truths, the understanding must present

²⁸ "C'est à cet état *complexe*, mêlé de certitude et de doute, de certitude habituelle, latente et de doute actuel, explicite, que répond la désignation du doute fictif ou méthodique" (Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 71).

a valid ground for that suspicion; or at least it must present these truths in such a way that of their very nature they elicit in the mind a state of uncertainty and thus render the doubt legitimate.

While Mercier's conception of the methodical doubt can thus be transcribed in terms of Cartesian philosophy, the remainder of his interpretation is altogether alien to its spirit and, as we shall see, leads to impossible conclusions.

In contrast with Hamelin, Mercier holds that Descartes not only rejects knowledge based on prejudice, on opinion, and on sense experience, but also questions the validity of the immediate data of our consciousness, whether they refer to a concrete experience or to an abstract truth. At this point we may interrupt Mercier's argument by recalling Hamelin's. Has the latter not shown that the evidence of intuitive knowledge remains inviolate? Has he not cited texts which indicate that "the notions . . . which are known without any affirmation or denial" are immune from error?²⁹ Mercier, however, is able to answer the objection simply by matching Hamelin's text by one of his own selection.

. . . I am here, seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other similar matters. . . . it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and that I perceive it . . .³⁰

What could be more self-evident than this immediate awareness of his own physical state? Still, Descartes is able to doubt it. He doubts "all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations"³¹ and casts suspicion on the simplest intellectual propositions: ". . . how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined?"³²

²⁹ See n. 25 and the text referred to there.

³⁰ *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 145-56). ". . . je suis ici, assis auprès du feu, vêtu d'une robe de chambre, ayant ce papier entre les mains, et autres choses de cette nature. . . . c'est avec dessein et de propos délibéré que j'étends cette main et que je la sens" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 14]). ". . . ut jam me hic esse, foco assidere, hyemali toga esse indutum, chartam istam manibus contrectare, et similia. . . . manum istam prudens et sciens extendo et sentio . . ." (*ibid.*, VII, 18-19).

³¹ *Discourse*, IV (Haldane and Ross, I, 101). ". . . toute les raisons que j'avais prises auparavant pour demonstrations . . ." (*Discours*, IV [Adam et Tannery, VI, 32]).

³² *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 147). ". . . que . . . deux et trois joints ensemble forment toujours le nombre de cinq, que le carré n'aura jamais plus de quatre côtés . . . ou . . . de quelque chose plus facile, si l'on se peut imaginer rien de plus facile que cela" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery,

Mercier carries the doubt still further. Even the validity of the faculties of knowledge is challenged. As Hamelin remarks,³³ there is no explicit statement to that effect in the texts. However, from his point of view, which is evidently Thomistic, Mercier can easily derive the untrustworthiness of our faculties of knowledge from the untrustworthiness of the senses. Since, according to Thomistic philosophy, there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses, the condemnation of sense knowledge inevitably vitiates intellectual knowledge and with it the faculties of intellectual knowledge as well. This, of course, would be too crude an interpretation of Descartes in the light of St. Thomas, which we can hardly attribute to Mercier. He does, in fact, base his views not on the rejection of sense knowledge, but on the supposition of the *malin génie*.³⁴ However, to derive such consequences from the hyperbolic doubt would still seem to imply that Mercier looks at Descartes from the point of view of St. Thomas. For an idealist, such as Hamelin, Mercier's inference is not a necessary one. He can and does conceive the *malin génie* as grounded in reality, but external to the mind, as an outside compulsion which the mind can resist. From the Cartesian point of view, as we shall see later, the assumption of the *Dieu trompeur* is able to produce a real doubt without endangering the validity of the faculties of knowledge themselves. In an Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of knowledge, the situation is different. The concept is simply the intellectual structure of the thing known, with which the mind identifies itself. Consequently, the point at which the deceiver interferes is not the idea or concept. It must be either the thing or the intellect. A change of the thing, of course, would not bring a falsification of our knowledge. Our knowledge could be distorted only by distorting the intellect. Once this distortion has taken place, the intellect is forever rendered incapable of knowing things as they really are. Had Descartes allowed this to happen, then nothing would be able to resist the annihilating force of the doubt. The *malin génie* would have gotten completely out of hand and Descartes would

IX, 16]). ". . . ita ego ut fallar quoties duo et tria simul addo, vel numero quadrati latera, vel si qui aliud facilius fingi potest?" (*ibid.*, VII, 21).

³³ "On a dit, peut-être plus d'une fois, que l'hypothèse du *malin génie* équivalait à celle d'une fausseté essentielle de l'intelligence. Rien de plus inexact, à supposer que notre interprétation soit vraie, et rien de plus contraire aux déclarations mêmes de Descartes" (Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 119).

³⁴ "L'intelligence et la raison, à qui il incombe de connaître les vérités immédiate d'ordre idéal et les conclusions de nos raisonnements, sont suspectes, car *que sais-je si le Dieu qui peut tout et par qui j'ai été fait et crée tel que je suis . . . ne m'a pas fait tel que je me trompasse toujours?*" (Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 75).

be in the fix of the *Zauberlehrling: die ich rief die Geister, werd ich nun nicht los.*

Mercier knows none of the safeguards which Descartes applies to his theory of the doubt and some of which Hamelin endeavors to retain. In a veritable orgy of destruction, the doubt is carried to its bitter end. And standing before the crumbling edifice of Descartes's philosophy, Mercier exclaims:

You have made the mistake of declaring yourself disobedient to the light of evidence; you have done ill to appeal to it at this moment. You have allowed the wings of intelligence to be clipped; do not try any more to make it fly; it is too late.³⁵

Mercier admittedly does not question Descartes's intentions, and the exegesis of his thought he considers of secondary importance only.³⁶ He is interested solely in the logical implications of the doubt; these implications he draws out relentlessly, without regard for Descartes's point of view. Nevertheless, his interpretation is of value in that it teaches us an object lesson of the futility of trying to understand Descartes in the light of a metaphysics which is not his own. And it also brings home to us the ineffectualness of an interpretation such as Hamelin's, which does not carry the doubt as far as Descartes's philosophy permits it to be carried. For it thus exposes him to attack by a less sympathetic expositor, who extends the doubt without taking the precautions which Descartes is able to take, and brings his entire philosophic structure to ruin. To Hamelin, as an idealist, the immediate data of consciousness are all of equal value. Consequently, when he comes across the statement "But I have denied . . . by no means notions . . . which are known without any affirmation or denial"³⁷ he places all intuitive truths beyond the pale of the doubt. Hamelin's position seems plausible, and he can cite numerous texts to support his contention. The texts carry the meaning he ascribes to them, however, only because he views them with the eyes of an idealist. For these "notions" or "idées" are not for Descartes what they are for Hamelin. Descartes's ideas are passively received in the understanding.

³⁵ "Vous avez commis la maladresse de vous vous déclarer réfractaire aux claretés de l'évidence: vous êtes mal venu de vous en réclamer en ce moment. Vous avez laissé couper les ailes à l'intelligence: n'essayez plus de lui faire prendre sa volée; il est trop tard" (*ibid.*, p. 85).

³⁶ "Nous ne mettons évidemment en cause les *intentions* du philosophe français; elles étaient, nous l'avons dit déjà, incontestablement dogmatiques; d'ailleurs, à vrai dire, le point de vue exégétique concernant la pensée de Descartes nous est ici très secondaire . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 84).

³⁷ See n. 25 and the text referred to there.

The understanding does not exercise the function of the judgment; it just holds the ideas ready for the will to affirm or deny. Considered only in so far as the understanding holds them, they are no more true than a blotch of green which I may perceive is true. They just are. They are immune from error, not because they are true, but because they are neither true nor false. A judgment is required to give them a point of reference,³⁸ to raise them to the status of ideas in an idealistic sense; and only after the will has conferred upon them a truth value can they be said to be subject to doubt or exempt from it.

Mercier, being a realist, is not bound to recognize Hamelin's idealistic reasons for leaving intuitive knowledge intact. He has just as much right as Hamelin to apply his own particular outlook, which makes Descartes's philosophy appear in a different light. Supporting texts, as we have seen, are not wanting; and under the pressure of Mercier's critical analysis, the very ground yields even before the structure can be erected upon it. In the light of the metaphysics which is behind Mercier's criticism, the condemnation of intuitive knowledge carries the rest of Cartesian philosophy to its inevitable doom. Do we not have Descartes's own statement? ". . . I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested."³⁹ But if the very principles and laws of thought are under suspicion, the nature of our faculties of knowledge cannot hope to remain unscathed.⁴⁰

Fortunately for Mercier, after clearing away the debris of Descartes's philosophy, he can put in its place the one which he advocates. If Descartes's critic, however, had been without firm philosophical con-

³⁸ "Maintenant, pour ce qui concerne les idées, si on les considère seulement en elles-mêmes, et qu'on ne les rapporte point à quelque autre chose, elles ne peuvent, à proprement parler, être fausses: car, soit que j'imagine une chèvre ou une chimère, il n'est pas moins vraie que j'imagine l'une que l'autre" (*Meditations*, III [Adam et Tannery, IX, 29]). "Jam quod ad ideas attinet, si solae in se spectentur, nec ad aliud quid illas referam, falsae proprie esse non possunt; nam sive capram, sive chimaeram imaginem, non minus verus est me unam imaginari quam alteram" (*ibid.*, VII, 37).

³⁹ *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 145). ". . . je m'attaquerai d'abord aux principes, sur lesquels toutes mes anciennes opinions étaient appuyées" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 14]). [Italics mine.] ". . . aggrediar statim ipsa principia, quibus illud omne quod olim credidi nitebatur" (*ibid.*, VII, 18).

⁴⁰ "En effet, la critique cartésienne renverse nécessairement, de fond en comble, tout l'édifice des convictions humaines, parcequ'elle ruine les principes mêmes par lesquelles nous connaissons. Tantot, c'étaient les actes des sens, de la conscience ou de la raison qui étaient mis en doutes, maintenant ce sont les facultés elles-mêmes qui sont frappées de suspicion et, avec elles, toutes leurs informations" (Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 75).

victions of his own, if he had had nothing to offer with which to fill the vacancy, then mental chaos would have been the inevitable outcome of such destructive criticism. Such a thinker might be a skeptic at heart and not afraid of accepting the ruinous consequences of Mercier's *argumentum ad absurdum*. But instead of being content with a condemnation of Descartes's point of departure, he might condemn the possibility of man's attainment of truth as a whole.

Mercier's interest, therefore, would have been better served if his critique had taken a different course. As a realist, and convinced of the rationality of the universe and its accessibility to the human mind, he might have argued that if the universal doubt entails impossible consequences, the very *adoption* of the universal doubt must likewise be impossible. Conversely, if we are trying to understand how Descartes can see his position as a possible one, we should show first of all *how* the attitude of the universal doubt can be safely adopted.

This raises the question of the legitimacy of the Cartesian doubt. An attempt to answer this question decisively was made by Antonio Lantrua when at the time of the centennial celebration of Descartes's *Discours de la Méthode* in 1937, he submitted as his contribution to the special edition of the *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica* an article entitled "Sulla legittimità del dubbio come posizione gnoseologico iniziale."⁴¹

In this article, Lantrua examines the reasons which Descartes gives in justification of the doubt. To begin with, he refers us to the first meditation, where Descartes says,

It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs which I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on that basis . . .⁴²

This statement is followed by the resolution ". . . I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted . . ."⁴³

⁴¹ Supplemento Speciale al Volume XIX (Luglio, 1937), pp. 555-56.

⁴² *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 144). "Il y a déjà quelque temps que je me suis aperçu que, dès mes premières années, j'avais reçu quantités de fausses opinions pour véritables et que ce que j'ai depuis fondé sur des principes si mal assurés, ne pouvait être que fort douteux et incertain" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 13]). "Animadverti jam ante aliquot annos quam multa, ineunte actate, falsa pro veris admiserim, et quam dubia sint quaecunque istis postea superextruxi, ac proinde funditus . . ." (*ibid.*, VII, 17).

⁴³ *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 144). ". . . il me fallait entreprendre sérieusement une fois en ma vie de me défaire de toutes les opinions que j'avais reçues jusques alors en ma créance" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 13]). ". . . omnia semel in vita esse evertenda" (*ibid.*, VII, 17).

It is hardly necessary to point out the disparity which exists between the basis of the doubt—that is, the limited number of false opinions and whatever has been derived from such opinions on the one hand, and, on the other, the extent of the doubt, which is unlimited. Descartes's resolution of discarding all previous opinions would be justified if he had received none but false opinions, which, of course, is not the case.

A similar disparity can be observed in the *Discours de la Méthode*, where Descartes decides to reject as "absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt."⁴⁴ Absolutely false and the least doubtful clearly are not equivalent terms.

In *The Principles of Philosophy*, the blame for the uncertainty of our knowledge and the consequent necessity of doubting once in one's life "so far as this is possible,"⁴⁵ is attributed to the uncritical attitude of our younger years when we accepted the information furnished by the senses on its face value. The fact of the case, as Lantrua points out, does not warrant the wholesale dismissal of all knowledge, for some of the simple truths acquired in childhood are as true today as they were then; and if a square tower appeared round at a distance in our childhood, it still does so to us as adults. All that Descartes could legitimately recommend is the adoption of a less credulous attitude in the acquisition of truth.

According to Lantrua, the reasons which Descartes gives for casting suspicion on sense and mathematical knowledge contain two fallacies. There is, first of all, the undue generalization which has already been pointed out. We are to reject the validity of sense knowledge because "our senses have before deceived us";⁴⁶ and we are to withdraw our trust in mathematical knowledge "because there are men who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into paralogisms, even concerning the simplest matters of geometry . . ."⁴⁷ Moreover, Lantrua points out, the validity of knowledge is implied in Descartes's very denial of it. How do we know that the senses at times deceive us except by

⁴⁴ *Discourse*, IV (Haldane and Ross, I, 101). ". . . absolument faux, tout ce en quoi je pouvais imaginer le moindre doute" (*Discours*, IV [Adam et Tannery, VI, 31]). [Italics mine.]

⁴⁵ *The Principles of Philosophy*, Part I (Haldane and Ross, I, 219). "... autant qu'il se peut . . ." (*Principes*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 25]).

⁴⁶ *Principles*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 220). "... nos sens nous ont trompés en plusieurs rencontres . . ." (*Principes*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 26]).

⁴⁷ *Discourse*, IV (Haldane and Ross, I, 101). "... parce qu'il y a des hommes qui se meprennent en raisonnant même touchant les plus simples matières de géométrie & y font des paralogisms . . ." (*Discours*, IV [Adam et Tannery, VI, 32]).

comparing instances in which they do with instances in which they do not? The vision of the tower as round is found to be erroneous when the same tower is viewed in proximity. Once the error has been discovered, the reason can explain it by comparing one vision with the other and pointing to the distance as the ground of their difference. But the facts necessary for the comparison of the true and the false must be furnished by the senses. In similar fashion, while we at times fall into error in our reasoning processes, we discover the error and correct it by means of our reason. This means that the knowledge we have of the untrustworthiness of our faculties in some cases implies the veracity of these same faculties in other cases.

Finally, Lantrua considers the theory of the great deceiver as utterly fantastic and without any foundation in reality whatsoever. It is unnecessary because the awareness of our own existence is an immediate datum of consciousness. In fact, it is a hindrance because the self whose existence is derived from the omnipotent deceiver exists only in order to be deceived. Nothing positive could have been built on such a *cogito*, had not Descartes simply abandoned the *malin génie* just as soon as it had made its appearance.⁴⁸

Lantrua, on this ground, therefore, concludes that the doubt is not a legitimate point of departure in philosophy.⁴⁹

If, for the adoption of a genuine attitude of doubt, we expect Descartes to give us reasons strong enough to determine the intellect to suspend judgment, we shall find that his theory of the doubt falls short of the mark. That on purely intellectual grounds the doubt cannot be justified is a fact which L. Liard recognized many years ago.⁵⁰ In Descartes's philosophy, Liard reminds us, the understanding merely sees and perceives, while the will affirms and denies. And because of this power of the will to give, or refrain from giving, its assent to the

⁴⁸ "... qualora la coscienza del mio essere la dovessi dedurre dall'essere io ingannato dal *genio maligno potentissimo* capace di ingannarmi in tutti i miei pensieri, io esisterei soltanto per essere ingannato, e non potrei in guisa alcuna procedere nel cammino del pensiero verso la verità. Infatti, il filosofo, se ha voluto costruire qualcosa sul suo Cogito, ha dovuto abbandonare, appena fattala, l'ipotesi dell'ingannatore sovrumano, e non pensarvi piu. Era dunque un'ipotesi perfettamente superflua" (Antonio Lantrua, "Sulla legittimità del dubbio come posizione gnoseologico iniziale," *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica*, Supplemento Speciale al Volume XIX [Luglio, 1937], p. 564).

⁴⁹ "... della dottrina cartesiana è indispensabile farne una valutazione critica oggettiva, quanto al suo valore di verità, indipendentemente da vincoli di tempo e di ambiente. È dunque necessario rimuovere ogni equivoco sulla possibilità di porre legittimamente il dubbio a fondamento del conoscere. Tale posizione non è legittimamente possibile" (*ibid.*, p. 565).

⁵⁰ L. Liard, *Descartes* (Paris: Baillière, 1882), pp. 141 ff.

ideas presented by the understanding, the will can counteract one of the most deep-seated inclinations of human nature.⁵¹ For what is more contrary to our nature than to deny those self-evident truths which seem to force themselves upon us, on the flimsy charge which Descartes is able to bring against them?⁵²

Henri Gouhier also appeals to the will in an effort to reduce the disparity which exists between the intellectual foundation of the doubt and the universality of its extension. But while Liard explains the doubt simply by referring to the will as a brute force, *une force capable de mettre en échec les plus irrésistibles raisons de croire*,⁵³ Gouhier, as we shall see, intellectualizes, so to speak, the function of the will by having it produce the idea of the *malin génie* which in turn brings about the universal doubt.

The classical arguments, say Gouhier, have cast suspicion on the senses; and we cannot be certain whether there exists something outside the mind corresponding to the images which they convey. Mathematical truths, however, seem to be valid regardless of whether there is an outside world, whether we perceive them while awake or while asleep. Descartes is faced with the question of whether he should make the mathematical truths the point of departure of his philosophy or whether he should push the doubt still further. The validity of these simple mathematical truths, according to Gouhier, Descartes has never questioned. If he nevertheless manages to push the doubt still further, he can do so only by appealing to a reason which is beyond these immediately evident truths: the mystery surrounding the origin of our being.

Since our creator is still unknown, we cannot be certain whether he has not created us in a manner such that we are always deceived. If it be objected that deceptiveness as a weakness is incompatible with divine goodness, we may answer that men in fact are at times deceived in the most simple matters. Furthermore, we do not know whether the

⁵¹ "Le doute méthodique est un parti pris de la volonté contre l'une des inclinations les plus naturelles et les plus puissantes de la nature humaine . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 143).

⁵² "La science est faite; tout en elle est clareté et distinction, par conséquent raison de croire. Et sans ce parti pris de la volonté contre elle-même, que vaudraient les raisons de douter qu'il allègue, contre les raisons de croire jaillissant des claretés de la science?" (*ibid.*, p. 144). "Prises en elles-mêmes, ces raisons simplement vraisemblables, n'auraient pas tenu un seul instant devant les claretés de la science, si la volonté ne leur avait temporairement fourni une force capable de mettre en échec les plus irrésistibles raisons de croire" (*ibid.*, p. 145).

⁵³ *Ibid.*

originator of our being is perfect. And the less perfect he is, the greater the possibility that we are subject to continual deception.

The reason given is sufficient to undermine all certitude, whether it refers to the existence of an outside world or the absolute value of such simple mathematical truths as expressed by the proposition that two plus three equals five. But while we have lost certitude, the probabilities are still in favor of the truths we are trying to doubt. The resistance to the doubt is strengthened by the habits acquired in our practical lives: to accept the more probable in place of certainty, where certainty is not attainable. As Gouhier puts it, our thought has merely descended from the *rationnel* to the *raisonnable*,⁵⁴ and unless we succeed in applying the doubt to the probable as well, our doubt will not be complete.

The intellect, weighing the reasons for and against the universal doubt, finds that in spite of the errors of our senses, it is more reasonable to accept the existence of an outside world than to deny it, and that in spite of the obscurity of our origin, it is more reasonable to accept than to reject the evidence of the self-evident mathematical propositions. The scale must be made to balance; the probabilities must be equalized; only then is the mind able to suspend judgment and admit the universal doubt.

It is at this crucial moment, according to Gouhier, that the will plays its most significant role. With the aid of the imagination it produces the idea⁵⁵ which, when placed on the scale, will establish the equilibrium and render all possibilities equally uncertain.⁵⁶

I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me . . .⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Gouhier, "Le Malin génie dans l'itinéraire cartésien," *Revue de Philosophie* (Janvier, 1937), p. 5.

⁵⁵ "Le malin génie . . . est l'oeuvre de ma volonté, qui l'a désiré, et mon imagination, qui l'a fabriqué . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 10-11).

⁵⁶ ". . . je crois plutôt à l'absence d'une tromperie originelle qu'à l'hypothèse contraire: le malin génie biffe ces 'plutôt' en rétablissant l'équilibre par un pessimisme radical qui rend également probables les solutions pratiquement abandonnées" (*ibid.*, p. 9).

⁵⁷ *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 148). "Je supposerai donc qu'il y a, non point un vrai Dieu, qui est la souveraine source de vérité, mais un certain mauvais génie, non moins ruse et trompeur que puissant, qui a employé toute son industrie à me tromper" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 171]). "Supponam igitur non optimum Deum, fontem veritatis, sed genium aliquem malignum, eundemque summe potentem et callidum, omnem suam industriam in eo possuisse, ut me falleret" (*ibid.*, VII, 22).

The mind is now in possession of a clear and distinct idea. The conception permits of no argument concerning the compatibility of its elements which might jeopardize the doubt. The effectiveness of the deceiver springs from the simplicity of its attributes: it is all powerful in its deception. The universal doubt is complete. The device has the further advantage of not becoming troublesome when it has served its purpose and is called upon to make its exit. The *cogito* withstands its power and reveals its omnipotent deceptiveness as illusory. With the elimination of its one and only attribute its nature vanishes. ". . . il est absorbé comme par son propre néant."⁵⁸

The very ease with which Gouhier's *malin génie* can be disposed of should arouse our suspicion. What has Gouhier's interpretation really accomplished? The doubt itself was found to be doubtful, because the nature of the case did not yield an idea which could swing the scale in favor of the universal doubt. Truth threatened to break through prematurely in the form of probabilities.⁵⁹ To fill the breach, the will produced the imaginary deceiver.

This action on the part of the will seems to aggravate rather than alleviate the situation. How can this artificial creation be expected to hold back the truth? Expressing it in terms of Cartesian philosophy, how can we allow the will to produce an idea and place it in the understanding just because the understanding finds itself incapable of supplying a desirable idea out of its own deposits? Such an idea, it would seem, cannot even be expected to counteract the habits of thought which are based on the actual experience of our practical lives and which urge us to accept the probable where the certain is unattainable.

Instead of making use of this pseudo-idea produced by the will, would it not be less misleading if, like Liard, we base the doubt on the brute force of the will, on its power to withhold assent? We might then be induced to ask questions which will eventually lead us out of the impasse. We might ask, for instance, what, in Descartes's philosophy, gives the will such power? What is his conception of truth that it permits him, even temporarily, to cast out all probabilities and banish them into the realm of falsehoods by a sheer act of the will? Clearly, it must be quite different from that held by his professors at the Jesuit

⁵⁸ Gouhier, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁵⁹ Descartes would then be right back at his point of departure, for his whole aim is to convert the probabilities with which we must be content in the practical life, into metaphysical certainties: "Bien que nous soyons suffisamment persuadés qu'il y a *des corps qui sont véritablement dans le monde*, néanmoins . . . il est besoin que nous recherchions ici des raisons qui nous en fassent avoir une science certain" (*Principes*, II [Adam et Tannery, IX, 63]).

College who taught on the authority of St. Thomas. Nor could it have been in agreement with the Augustinian tradition which nurtured the intellectual life of his friends at the Oratory. In Augustinian and Thomistic philosophy, even God must recognize truth and has no power over it, inasmuch as he cannot violate the laws of his own being.

We might ask further, Why should the mystery of our origin cause us to doubt truths which are immediately evident? Does this not imply an absolute indifference on the part of God, not only with reference to the existence of contingent things but also in regard to truth? When Descartes initiates the hyperbolic doubt, does he not attribute to the will of God a power which is somewhat like the power of the human will in the judgment? The human will can only withhold judgment; it can refuse to assent; the divine will can pervert truth, at least for us.

. . . since to err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author to whom they assign my origin the less powerful. To these reasons I have certainly nothing to reply, but at the end I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty [in the sciences].⁶⁰

⁶⁰ *Meditations*, I (Haldane and Ross, I, 147-48). " . . . puisque faillir et se tromper est une espèce d'imperfection, d'autant moins puissant sera l'auteur qu'ils attribueront à mon origine, d'autant plus sera-t-il probable que je suis tellement imparfait que je me trompe toujours. Auxquelles raisons je n'ai certes rien à répondre, mais je suis contraint d'avouer que, de toutes les opinions que j'avais autrefois reçues en ma créance pour véritables, il n'y en a pas une de laquelle je ne puisse maintenant douter, non par aucune inconsideration ou légèreté, mais par des raisons très-fortes et murement considérées: de sorte qu'il est nécessaire que j'arrête et suspende désormais mon jugement sur les pensées et que je ne leurs donne pas plus de créance que je ferais à des choses qui me paraîtraient évidemment fausses, si je désire trouver quelque chose de constant . . . dans les sciences" (*Meditations*, I [Adam et Tannery, IX, 16-17]). " . . . quoniam falli et errare imperfectio quaedam esse videtur, quo minus potentem originis meae authorem assignabunt, eo probabilius erit me tam imperfectum esse ut semper fallar. Quibus sane argumentis non habeo quod respondeam, sed tandem cogor fateri nihil esse ex iis quae olim vera putabam, de quo non liceat dubitare, idque non per inconsiderantiam vel levitatem, sed propter validas et meditata rationes; ideoque etiam ab iisdem, non minus quam ab aperte falsis, accurate deinceps assensionem esse cohibendam, si quid certi velim invenire" (*ibid.*, VII, 21-22).

For nothing less than the possibility of a perversion of truth can satisfy the intellectual requirements of the universal doubt.

This power on the part of the originator of our being, whatever his nature may be, carries, as its first implication, a representative theory of knowledge. Mercier's interpretation has shown that in traditional philosophy the assumption of an omnipotent deceiver is fraught with danger, for it is bound to vitiate our faculties of knowledge and make all further progress impossible. Only in a representative theory of knowledge can the deceiver make its baneful influence felt at a point midway between the faculties and reality. He can present us with ideas which are not truly representative. This, in turn, carries the further implication that the ideas are under the control of the *will* of a supreme being and that therefore they are contingent beings which are not necessarily the conveyors of absolute truth.

An investigation into the conditions of the possibility of the universal doubt, therefore, seems to lead us directly to all the essential factors of the theory of the creation of ideas.

We now have a doubt based on the will. But, unlike Liard and Gouhier, we must insist that it be based on the will of God as well as the will of man. For the power and the operation of the human will cannot be explained in terms of its nature alone. Unless God is the creator of the ideas, unless the ideas are dependent on his will rather than his intelligence, and therefore relative to us rather than absolute in themselves, the will can have no influence on the truth value of the ideas; it could not exercise the function of the judgment and would not be free to accept or reject them.

Because of the volitional character of the doubt, it is not difficult to consider it as methodical, in the sense in which Mercier has defined the methodical doubt. We arbitrarily prescind from the idea we have of God as a perfect being, handed down to us through faith or tradition. We pretend to know nothing of God, because our knowledge of him has not as yet been formally established. We can go so far as to conceive God's will, on whom all truth depends, in a perverted form, as the *malin génie*, intent upon perpetual deception. In this sense, the doubt can even be called artificial. As an artifice, the doubt is checked by the *cogito*. When the self thinks itself as existing, no image enters between the subject and its object. The self is aware of its essence and its existence in one single intuition, which leaves no room for the *malin génie* to gain a foothold and perform its work of corruption.

But the volitional doubt is a genuine doubt nonetheless. For the will can do much more than set aside one approach to a given truth in order

to facilitate another approach. Because the will contributes to the very constitution of the ideas and because it is free, it can always refuse to acknowledge the truth of any idea. The unsubstantial reasons which Descartes gives in order to initiate the doubt are quite sufficient. All they are required to do is set the will in motion and induce the resolve of the doubt. Once it is set in motion, nothing can stop it except another resolve. The ideas certainly are unable to check the will, for the will is the partial cause of the truth of the ideas, inasmuch as it confers upon them objective validity by putting its trust in the goodness of the divine will.

It might be objected that the will is bound by the limits set by the understanding, as Descartes explains in the fourth meditation, in his discussion of error. The relationship of the ideas to the will, however, is not to be understood in terms of an intellectual determination of the will. The will is bound by the ideas inasmuch as the ideas are expressions of God's will, expressions of what he wills us to know. Man ought to conform his will to the will of God. But because man is a free agent, even in the act of knowledge, this conformity is based not on intellectual necessity, but on moral obligation. However, in the first meditation, the nature of the source of our knowledge is not yet known, and the moral obligation of the will does not formally exist.

Within the mind, the will reigns supreme. Nothing can arrest it in the act of doubt. But when the doubt is pushed to the limit, the will breaks through its proper realm. When the self in doubting becomes aware of its own existence, then the ideal and the real coalesce into one experience, and the will is halted by a brute fact over which it has no control.

To reach the limits of the doubt, the human will does not need the existence of an outside agent. Though infinite, it is, however, the function of a finite mind of a finite being. It is not unconditioned. Ultimately, the doubt is not founded on the human will, because man is not self-sufficient. Not to extend the doubt, but to put it on a more solid foundation, the doubt must be carried to the mind of God, to the divine will, which is the condition of the human will and hence the ultimate cause of man's doubt as an act of the will.

The roots of the doubt in all its forms extend so deep into Descartes's philosophy, that Gilson does not seem to do it justice when he says,

As a skeptic, Descartes doubts that which seems to him to be really doubtful; and he deliberately extends this skepticism to that about which he does not really doubt, but of

which he conceives the abstract possibility of doubting, for reasons which he imagines.⁶¹

Even the hyperbolic doubt, the *malin génie*, is not simply an imaginary artifice, for it does contain a positive element. It is the dependence of all truth on the will of an omnipotent God which gives the Cartesian doubt an extension it could never attain in any other philosophy. This dependence, this ultimate reason of the doubt, does not altogether cease to exist with the appearance of the *cogito*, nor even with the establishment of the existence of God, except that the threat of a perversion of truth is then turned into a divine guarantee. In Descartes's philosophy, the immediately evident truths have forever lost their absolute value. But they have lost it not because Descartes has carried the doubt into the very heart of the clear and distinct ideals themselves; on the contrary, the universal doubt was possible only because his theory of knowledge does not allow for absolute truths.

Because of the relative value of the ideas, we need not fear with Hamelin that a possibly irrational universe might do violence to our mind.⁶² The problem of the irrationality of the universe, in this sense, does not arise in Descartes and therefore demands no solution, simply because the ideas do not reach as far as reality. They are merely its representatives, and in this function they are accredited not by the world which they represent, but by the author of the world and of their own being.

For the same reason we can safely carry the doubt to the clear and distinct ideas and still avoid the pitfalls which in Mercier's interpretation cause disaster. The ideas are not the outcome of the interaction of intellect and reality, so that from the product we could conclude to the corruption of the faculties. The ideas are passively received in the mind, and neither the intellect nor reality need necessarily have any share in them.

In contrast with their complete indifference to both reality and mind, is the absolute reliance of the ideas on the guarantee of God. We have before us the proposition that two plus three equals five. We are aware of it in its clarity and its distinctiveness. But of what value would be our certainty of this awareness without God's guarantee that the proposition has a real value, that it reflects a law of a being with

⁶¹ See n. 22.

⁶² "Le malin génie n'est pas autre chose qu'une personnification de la violence qui fait peut-être subir à l'esprit la nature peut-être irrationnelle de l'univers. Et, pour répondre, il faudra faire disparaître cette nature irrationnelle. Il est vrai que la réponse risquera d'entraîner pour Descartes bien des difficultés" (Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 118).

which we do not get in direct contact, that it is true not only here and now, but that it will always be true? Let us suppose that we have gone through a long and complicated reasoning process. We have started out with a clear and distinct idea, and we have added other clear and distinct ideas only when, with the ideas, we have intuitively perceived their necessary connections. The chain of intuitions is too long to be held simultaneously present to the mind. To accept the conclusion, is it sufficient to recall the method we have followed and the fact that we have perceived the necessary connections although the chain in its entirety is no longer present in our mind? How do we know that the ideas, if we were to attempt to bring about their reappearance in the mind, would still be the same? Since they are independent of the mind and of reality, how can we know that meanwhile others have not been put in their place, how can we be sure of the permanence of the essences unless we have the divine guarantee, based on the immutability of the divine will?⁶³

. . . it is enough for us to remember that we have perceived something clearly, in order to be sure that it is true; but this would not suffice, unless we knew that God existed and that he did not deceive us.⁶⁴

⁶³ We cannot, therefore, agree with Gilson when in the "Commentaire Historique" to the *Discours de la Méthode* he expresses the view that it is the memory and not the intuition which is in need of the divine guarantee: "De toute façon, le doute ne porte pas ici sur l'intuition actuelle des démonstrations mathématiques, mais sur le souvenir des raisons qui nous ont autrefois semblé démonstratives; c'est en effet la mémoire, et non l'intuition, que Descartes jugera nécessaire de garantir" (*Réné Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, Texte et Commentaire* [Paris, 1925] p. 290).

In a later work, Gilson still stresses the need of a guarantee of the memory: "En disant que peut-être Dieu nous trompe et que nous ne savons rien de science certaine tant que nous n'avons pas prouvé qu'il est véridique, Descartes jette une suspicion générale sur la valeur du souvenir de nos evidences" (*Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien* ["Études de philosophie médiévale," XIII (Paris: Vrin, 1930)], pp. 238-39). "L'évidence peut se suffire et se suffit, mais elle ne garantit pas l'infailibilité de la mémoire . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 237). However, when he continues, ". . . elle ne garantit même pas la permanence de sa propre vérité dans l'intervalle de deux intuitions. Pour que ce qui est vrai, reste vrai, il faut donc une garantie distincte de l'évidence même, un principe stable de certitude, et c'est la vérité divine qui le fournit" (*ibid.*, p. 237), he seems to realize more and more that although the needed guarantee is mentioned in connection with the memory, the memory merely expresses the temporal aspect of the essences, and it is the permanence of their temporal appearance which must be assured by the divine veracity, just as our temporal existence can be preserved only by a continued creative act of God's will.

⁶⁴ *Reply to Objections, IV* (Haldane and Ross, II, 115). ". . . il suffit que nous nous ressouvenions d'avoir conçu une chose clairement, pour être assurés qu'elle

In conclusion, then, it can be said that when Descartes desires, pretends, and feigns to doubt,⁶⁵ he still acts for good and well considered reasons.⁶⁶ For when he doubts with such abandon and seeming arbitrariness, he doubts because the nature of his will and his conception of truth allow him thus to doubt, and because of the way in which his will and truth are related to the will of God.

est vraie, ce qui ne suffirait pas, si nous ne savions que Dieu existe et qu'il ne peut être trompeur" (*Quatrièmes Réponses* [Adam et Tannery, IX, 190]). ". . . après . . . reconnu qu'il y a un Dieu, pour ce qu'en même temps j'ai reconnu aussi que toutes choses dépendent de lui et qu'il n'est point trompeur, et qu'ensuite de cela j'ai jugé que tout ce que je conçois clairement et distinctement ne peut manquer d'être vrai, encore que je ne pense plus aux raisons pour lesquelles j'ai jugé cela être véritable, *pourvu [seulement] que je me resouvienne de l'avoir clairement et distinctement compris*, on ne me peut apporter aucune raison contraire qui me le fasse jamais revoquer en doute" (*ibid.*, IX, 55-56). [Italics mine.] "Postquam vero percepi Deum esse, quia simul etiam intellexi caetera omnia ab eo pendere, illumque non esse fallacem; atque inde collegi illa omnia, quae clare et distincte percipio, necessario esse vera; etiamsi non attendam amplius ad rationes propter quas istud verum esse judicavi, modo tantum recorder me clare et distincte perspexisse, nulla ratio contraria afferri potest, quae me ad dubitandum impellat" (*ibid.*, VII, 70).

See also: "Il y a d'autres choses que notre entendement conçoit aussi fort clairement, lorsque nous prenons garde de près aux raisons d'où dépend leur connaissance; et pour ce, nous ne pouvons pas alors en douter: mais, *parce que nous pouvons oublier ces raisons et cependant nous ressouvenir des conclusions qui en ont été tirées*, on demande si l'on peut avoir une ferme et immuable persuasion de ces conclusions, tandis que nous nous ressouvenons qu'elles ont été déduites de principes très évidentes . . . Et je réponds que ceux-là en peuvent avoir, qui connaissent tellement Dieu qu'ils savent qu'il ne se peut pas faire que la faculté d'entendre, qui leur a été donnée par lui, ait autre chose que la vérité pour objet; mais que les autres n'en ont point" (*ibid.*, IX, 114-15). [Italics mine.]

⁶⁵ See nn. 10-12 *supra* and the texts referred to there.

⁶⁶ See n. 2 *supra* and the text referred to there.

THE MEANING OF SOME QUOTATIONS FROM ST. AUGUSTINE IN THE *SUMMA* *THEOLOGICA* OF ST. THOMAS

ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST

It is widely held that Scholastic method¹ began with collocations, or *sententiae*, of certain pronouncements made by one or several church fathers.² Naturally, when materials are collated, it is inevitable that discrepancies work their way in; and hence the early Scholastics, whose chief aim was to arrive at one single solution or truth, also were obliged to reconcile these discrepancies. Abelard's famous *sic et non* method, for instance, is primarily concerned with reconciling what on first sight seems to be nothing more than intellectual discord and antagonism.³ This method soon became the standard procedure for all subsequent *disputationes*, *quaestiones*, and *disputationes de quodlibet*. Of course, Abelard's method presupposed that apparently conflicting assertions could be reconciled. By itself, however, it failed to bring about this reconciliation, a task which was reserved for the followers of Abelard.

This procedure, nevertheless, lies behind all the various *quaestiones* and *articuli* which make up the many *summae* and *summulae* of the Scholastic thinkers.⁴ When one analyzes the Scholastic *quaestio*, one

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¹ Cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (2 vols.; Freiburg im Breisgau, 1909-11), and the many brilliant analyses of the meaning of the term "Scholastic method" contained therein.

² The first known collocation of *sententiae*—those of St. Augustine—was compiled by Tiro Prosper of Aquitania and appeared in 392 under the title *Liber Sententiarum ex Operibus S. Augustini Delibatarum*.

³ Abelard, *Sic et Non* (PL, CLXXVIII, 1349 ff.).

⁴ Cf. Denifle-Ehrle, "Studien. Die Sentenzen Abaelards und die Bearbeitungen seiner Theologia vor Mitte de 12 Jhs. 3. Endresultate," *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchen-Geschichte des Mittelalters* (1885), I, 620; M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, 199 ff.; F. Picavet, *Abélard et Alexandre de Hales, créatures de la méthode scolastique* (Paris, 1896); J. A. Endres, "Ueber den Ursprung und die Entwicklung der scholastischen Lehrmethode," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, II

finds first of all a clearly formulated question which, as a rule, is answered either in a definite positive or in a definite negative way. In addition, one finds a series of arguments—the objections—in support of one or several views which contradict (or seem to contradict) the final and decisive view which will presently be substantiated and maintained in the main argument. The majority of the arguments which support the view or views which are later rejected are usually taken from certain writings the author regards as authoritative, although occasionally the author himself may prefer to add a few of his own making. Then follows what the author regards as the true and authoritative reply to the original question, buttressed by one or several quotations also taken from some authoritative source. The whole question is finally concluded by a separate discussion and disposal of the introductory objection or objections (the *responsio ad objectionem*). These, invariably, are shown to be irrelevant, if not erroneous.

This *sic et non* method, devised by Abelard,⁵ was adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas and reached its highest development in his *Summa Theologica*. Since St. Thomas had made full use of the theological and philosophical wisdom of St. Augustine by making many Augustinian

(1889), 52-59. Grabmann (*op. cit.*, II, 219 ff.), however, is inclined to minimize somewhat the influence of Abelard's *sic et non* method on the subsequent development of the Scholastic method.

⁵It would be erroneous, however, to call Abelard the founder of the "Scholastic method." As a matter of fact, this type of didactic or dialectical method which operates by opposing authoritative views or dicta came into use long before the time of Abelard. Grabmann (*op. cit.*, I, 113) points out that the *Quaestiones Amphiloichianae* of Photius (d. 891) were written in the form of ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις, that is, "questions and answers." Cf. J. Hergenröther *Monumenta Graeca ad Photium Eiusque Historiam Pertinentia* (Ratisbona, 1869), III, 298 ff. The *sic et non* or Scholastic method was also used by the following men preceding Abelard: Gerbert of Aurillac (d. 1003) (*PL*, CXXXIX, 179 ff.; Grabmann, *op. cit.*, I, 213 ff.); the canonist Bernold of Constance (d. 1100) in his *Tractatus de Sacramentis Excommunicatorum iuxta Assertionem Sanctorum Patrum* (*PL*, CXLVIII, 1061-68), his *De Vitanda Excommunicatorum Communionem, De Reconciliatione Lapsorum, et De Conciliorum, Canonum, Decretorum, Decretalium, Ipsorumque Pontificum Romanorum Auctoritate Liber* (*PL*, CXLVIII, 1181-1218), and in his *De Prudenti Dispensatione Ecclesiasticarum Sanctionum* (*PL*, CXLVIII, 1265-72); Cardinal Deusdedit (see V. Glanvell, *Die Kanonessammlung des Kardinals Deusdedit* [Paderborn, 1905], vol. I; Grabmann, *op. cit.*, I, 239); Ivo of Chartres (d. 1186) in his *Prologus in Decretum a Se Concinnatum et Partibus seu Libris Septem ac Decem Digestum* (*PL*, CLXI, 47 ff.) (see Grabmann, *op. cit.*, I, 242); St. Anselm of Canterbury in his *Tractatus de Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis necnon Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio* (*PL*, CLVIII, 507) (see Grabmann, *op. cit.*, I, 334). Bernold of Constance (*op. cit.*, *PL*, CXLVIII, 1214) states: "Harum sententiarum diversitatem facile concordabimus."

ideas an integral part of his own teachings,⁶ the *Summa Theologica* presents many interesting problems concerning the relationship between these two great doctors of the church. It is especially significant to uncover the attitude of St. Thomas towards some of the more fundamental Augustinian statements and also to ascertain what particular use he made of these Augustinian pronouncements within the framework of his own method of exposing the truth.⁷

When discussing the many Augustinian passages found in the *Summa Theologica* we must always keep in mind that some of these references are not literal quotations or faithful reproductions of the original texts, but instead abbreviated restatements of not always exact reformulations of Augustinian notions. Since in many instances St. Thomas repeats again and again the same abbreviated quotation we may safely assume that this particular quotation is actually one of those standard or standardized citations which were commonly used by the various schools of theology and philosophy. Hence it is quite possible that St. Thomas occasionally quoted from *florilegia* and compilations of *sententiae* without actually having consulted the original Augustinian text.⁸ Such a procedure, undoubtedly, is conducive to misinterpretations

⁶ Cf. G. Phelan, *Some Illustrations of St. Thomas' Development of the Wisdom of St. Augustine* (Chicago: The Argus Press, 1946).

⁷ The reader should consult É. Gilson, "Pour quoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, I (1926-27), 5-127, and his "L'Idée de philosophie chez S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticae* (1931); G. Hertling, *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie*, ed. J. Endres (Kempten und München, 1914), pp. 97-151; P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme du XIIIe siècle* (Louvain, 1911), I, 44 ff.; J. Hessen, *Augustinische und thomistische Erkenntnislehre* (Paderborn, 1921); A. Gardeil, "Le 'mens' d'après S. Augustin et S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XIII (1924), 145-61. As to the relationship of St. Thomas to the Augustinianism of the thirteenth century in general, see, among others, P. Minges, "Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zwischen der Summe Alexanders von Hales und des hl. Thomas von Aquino," *Franziskanische Studien*, III (1916), 58-76; M. Grabmann, *Die philosophische und theologische Erkenntnislehre des Matthaeus von Aquasparte, ein Beiträge zur Geschichte des Verhältnisses zwischen Augustinismus und Aristotelismus im mittelalterlichen Denken* (Paderborn, 1906).

⁸ There is always a certain difficulty about any medieval author quoting another medieval or ancient author. Such quotations as a rule do not imply or even pretend that the author himself has either seen the passage quoted in the original, or is fully familiar with the particular context or text from which this quotation has been taken. We are quite safe in assuming that the majority of these quotations have been taken from secondary sources, usually from collections of *sententiae* or *florilegia*. It should also be remembered that because of the great scarcity of manuscripts many of these quotations are cited from memory rather than from an established text. Cf. M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, I, 54 ff., especially 82 ff., and 114 ff.; J. de Ghellinck, S.J., "Le Traité de Pierre Lombard sur les

or misquotation of the original passage. Thus in many instances the original meaning of the Augustinian passage appears somewhat altered, an alteration which is also the result of the fact that this passage had been lifted from its original context by the compiler of these *sententiae* or *florilegia*.⁹

Let us first discuss those purely "informative quotations" from St. Augustine which divulge the extent to which the African Doctor influenced medieval thought and medieval knowledge in matters of general erudition. These particular quotations are nearly all taken from the *De Civitate Dei* which was for St. Thomas and many other medieval thinkers one of the truly important source books of encyclopedic information. It is from the *De Civitate Dei* that St. Thomas derives the information that Cicero denied the existence of fate and providence;¹⁰ that Anaxagoras was condemned by the Athenians for having taught that the sun was a fiery mass of stone;¹¹ that some of the ancient philosophers taught the eternity of the world;¹² that some ancient philosophers asserted the reincarnation of the human soul;¹³ that Cicero called pity a virtue;¹⁴ that Varro considered God a soul governing the world by movement and reason;¹⁵ that the same Varro maintained that man is not the soul alone, nor the body alone, but both body and soul;¹⁶ that the Platonists assumed the existence of

sept ordres ecclésiastiques," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, X (1909), 290-302. Ghellinck mentions the many patristic *florilegia* of citations from the church fathers which went under the name of *tabulae alphabeticae*, *tabulae originalium*, *tabulae de concordantiis quorundam originalium*, *tabulae in Augustinum*, *tabulae in Anselmum*, *tabulae in Damascenum*, etc. Cf. *Epistola XXXVI* of Hugo Metellus, quoted in Ghellinck, *op. cit.*: "Nihil tibi de meo misi, cum cornicula alienis pennis me ornavi." Nevertheless, as Grabmann points out (*op. cit.*, I, 83), we must always distinguish between a theological school which primarily made use of such *florilegia*, and individual theologians such as St. Thomas Aquinas or St. Bonaventure who often studied the patristic sources. See also Denifle-Chatelain, *Inventarium Codicum Manuscriptorum Capituli Deriusensis* (Paris, 1896), p. 28.

⁹ Cf. Hertling, *op. cit.*, pp. 101 ff. Whenever St. Thomas quotes from St. Augustine he often merely states that this particular sentence or statement originated with St. Augustine. As a rule, however, he also quotes the work from which this statement has been taken.

¹⁰ *ST*, I, 116, 1, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, V, 9 (*PL*, XLI, 148).

¹¹ *ST*, I, 70, 3, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XVIII, 41 (*PL*, XLI, 601).

¹² *ST*, I, 46, 2 ad 1, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 4 (*PL*, XLI, 319).

¹³ *ST*, I, 46, 2 ad 8, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XII, 13 (*PL*, XLI, 361).

¹⁴ *ST*, I-II, 59, 1, arg. 3, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, IX, 5 (*PL*, XLI, 261). The Augustinian statement goes back to Cicero, *Oratio pro Quinto Ligario*, 12.

¹⁵ *ST*, I, 90, 1; 3, 8, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, VII, 6 (*PL*, XLI, 199) and IV, 31 (*PL*, XLI, 138). Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum*, I, 2.

¹⁶ *ST*, I, 75, 4, *sed contra*, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 3 (*PL*, XLI, 626).

demons which are placed between man and the gods;¹⁷ that the stoics and peripatetics disagreed as to whether or not the passions are compatible with moral virtue;¹⁸ that the Greeks call the emotions of the soul *πάθη*, which term Cicero translated by *perturbationes*, while others translated it by *affectiones* or *affectus*, and others again by *passiones*;¹⁹ that the Stoics held that in the soul of the wise man there are three *εὐπάθειαι*, i.e., three good passions in place of the three *perturbationes*.²⁰

These examples, which could be augmented considerably, deal with purely informative quotations of the erudite type and hence contribute little or nothing to the theological or philosophical truths expounded in the *Summa Theologica*.

Another kind of informative quotation from St. Augustine, however, is of some importance to our understanding of the degree to which St. Thomas incorporated Augustinian notions into his own theological and philosophical teachings. In about forty articles of his *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas, after having enumerated the various objections to his own thesis, continues by saying: "On the contrary, Augustine states (*sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus*)." In this particular instance the statement of St. Augustine constitutes for St. Thomas the main argument in support of the Thomistic thesis which he expounds further in the subsequent main discussion. (In addition we should also mention the many Augustinian passages which are quoted within the framework of the main discussion.) Thus St. Thomas fully agrees with St. Augustine that in God both essence and thought (intellect) are one and the same;²¹ that no one but God himself can create anything *ex nihilo*;²² that God sees all things together and at once—in other words, that the divine intellect is not discursive but simultaneous and constant;²³ that the infinite can be comprehended by God;²⁴ that corporeal things are not created by angels, but by God alone;²⁵ that

¹⁷ ST, I. 22. 3, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, IX, 1 (PL, XLI, 257) and VIII, 14 (PL, XLI, 238). Cf. ST, I. 63. 5, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 13 (PL, XLI, 329).

¹⁸ ST, I-II. 59. 2, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, IX, 4 (PL, XLI, 258).

¹⁹ ST, I-II. 22. 2, *sed contra*, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, IX, 4 (PL, XLI, 258). St. Augustine refers here to Cicero, *De finibus*, iii. 20; *De Tusculanis quaestionibus*, iii. 4; v. 5; iv. 6; and Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, iv. 2.

²⁰ ST, I-II. 59. 3, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XIV, 8 (PL, XLI, 411).

²¹ ST, I. 14. 4, *sed contra*, quoting *De Trinitate*, VII, 2 (PL, XLII, 936). Cf. VII, 1 (PL, XLII, 936) and VI, 4 (PL, XLII, 927).

²² ST, I. 45. 5, *sed contra*, quoting *De Trinitate*, III, 8 (PL, XLII, 876).

²³ ST, I. 14. 7, *sed contra*, quoting *De Trinitate*, XV, 14 (PL, XLII, 1077). Cf. ST, I. 12. 10, *sed contra*, quoting *De Trinitate*, XV, 16 (PL, XLII, 1079).

²⁴ ST, I. 14. 12, *sed contra*, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XII, 18 (PL, XLI, 368).

²⁵ ST, I. 65. 4, *sed contra*, quoting *De Trinitate*, III, 8 (PL, XLII, 875).

Origen's theory combining the fall of the angels with the creation of the material world²⁶ must be rejected;²⁷ that God at times does things, that is to say, works miracles which are contrary to the wonted course of nature;²⁸ that whatever things God has made are mutable, implying thereby that God in maintaining the universe constantly creates it;²⁹ that everything and every detail is subject to God's government;³⁰ that evil exists only in the good;³¹ that evil cannot consume the good;³² that God is not the author of evil;³³ that the soul is created in the likeness of God, its creator;³⁴ that the mind is something subsistent;³⁵ that the soul is single and immaterial.³⁶

These quotations belong to a category of citations which are incorporated in the *Summa Theologica* in order to lend additional authoritative support to St. Thomas's own thesis or argument. It would be erroneous to assume, however, that St. Thomas in every instance prefers the authority of St. Augustine to that of other theologians or philosophers. For it happens quite frequently that quotations from St. Augustine are found side by side with citations from St. John of Damascus,³⁷ St. Basil,³⁸ St. Ambrose,³⁹ the Venerable Bede,⁴⁰ and

²⁶ Origen, Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, I, 6 (PG, XI, 166); I, 8 (PG, XI, 178); II, 9 (PG, XI, 229).

²⁷ ST, I. 47. 2, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 23 (PL, XLI, 337).

²⁸ ST, I. 105. 6, *sed contra*, quoting *Contra Faustum Manichaeum Libri Triginta Tres*, XXVI, 3 (PL, XLII, 481).

²⁹ ST, I. 9. 2, *sed contra*, quoting *De Natura Boni*, 1 (PL, XLII, 551). The same idea appears in *De Genesi ad Litteram Libri Duodecim*, IV, 12 (PL, XXXIV, 304).

³⁰ ST, I. 103. 5, *sed contra*, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, V, 11 (PL, XLI, 153). Cf. also ST, I. 103. 6, *sed contra*, quoting *De Trinitate*, III, 4 (PL, XLII, 873).

³¹ ST, I. 48. 3, *sed contra*, quoting *Enchiridion ad Laurentium, sive de Fide, Spe et Caritate Liber Unus*, 14 (PL, XL, 238); cf. 12 (PL, XL, 237).

³² ST, I. 48. 4, *sed contra*, quoting *Enchiridion*, 12 (PL, XL, 237).

³³ ST, I. 49. 2, *sed contra*, quoting *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII Liber Unus*, 21 (PL, XL, 16).

³⁴ ST, I. 93. 1, quoting *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, 74 (PL, XL, 85), and *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI, 12 (PL, XXXIV, 347).

³⁵ ST, I. 75. 2, *sed contra*, quoting *De Trinitate*, X, 7 (PL, XLII, 979).

³⁶ ST, I. 75. 1, *sed contra*, quoting *De Trinitate*, VI, 6 (PL, XLII, 929). Cf. ST, I. 75. 5, *sed contra*, quoting *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VII, 7 (PL, XXXIV, 359); VII, 8 (PL, XXXIV, 359); VII, 9 (PL, XXXIV, 360).

³⁷ ST, I. 19. 6, quoting from St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, 103 (PL, XL, 280), and John of Damascus, *Expositio Accurata Fidei Orthodoxae*, II, 29 (PG, XCIV, 968).

³⁸ ST, I. 74. 2, quoting from St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, IV, 26 (PL, XXXIV, 314), and St. Basil, *Homiliae in Hexaëmeron*, 2 (PG, XXIX, 49).

Cf. ST, I. 72, quoting St. Basil, *op. cit.*, 7 (PG, XXIX, 163); St. Ambrose, *Hexaëmeron Libri Sex*, VI, 2 (PL, XIV, 258); and others.

³⁹ *Supra*, n. 38.

⁴⁰ ST, I. 72, quoting from St. Bede, *Hexaëmeron, sive Libri Quatuor in Prin-*

others.⁴¹

Another group of quotations from St. Augustine found in the *Summa Theologica*—and this group is a rather large one—could perhaps best be called “conventional” or “ornamental quotations.” These particular citations are primarily the product of the Scholastic method as employed by St. Thomas. Since, as a rule, in the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas quotes only a single authority in support of his main thesis, these ornamental citations from St. Augustine are usually, but not always, to be found in the so-called objections. Hence on first sight they seem to contradict the proposed Thomistic thesis. But upon closer scrutiny this is not really the case. For if we analyze this particular quotation in the light of the very context in which it is found, we discover that this apparent contradiction, which supposedly exists between the Augustinian statement and the thesis advanced by St. Thomas, can easily be removed by a dialectical distinction between the apparent and the true meaning of the Augustinian quotation. In other words, St. Thomas sharply distinguishes between the various meanings of a concept employed by St. Augustine, as well as the different viewpoints from which the problem is being discussed. After this distinction has been made successfully and the proper point of view gained, it becomes quite evident that actually no real conflict exists between the statement of St. Augustine and that of St. Thomas. Hence the concordance of Augustinian and Thomistic notions in many instances is above all a matter of correct interpretation and accurate distinction.

Let us illustrate this particular problem with the help of a few examples. In *Summa Theologica* I. 16. 1, the question is raised whether truth resides only in the intellect, as Aristotle seems to imply when he says that falsity and truth are not in the things.⁴² In the first objection St. Augustine is quoted as one who objects to this notion.

For Augustine condemns this definition of truth, *That is true which is seen . . .* and likewise rejects the notion that *That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know . . .* Therefore [St. Augustine] defines truth thus: *The true is which is.* It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.⁴³

capitulum Genesis usque ad Nativitatem Isaac et Electionem Ismaëlis, I, 24 (PL, XCI, 27).

⁴¹ See also *ST*, I. 69. 1; 66. 1; 67. 4; 69. 2. It should be noted that the quotations from several authors side by side with citations from St. Augustine generally deal with theological rather than philosophical problems.

⁴² *Metaphysics*, E, 3, 1027b25.

⁴³ Anton C. Pegis, *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (2 vols., New

St. Thomas counters these statements by pointing out in a discriminat-ing way that the truth is in the intellect so far as the intellect is con-formed to the thing understood; that is to say, so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Thus in an applied sense truth also resides in the things, namely, in that it resides primarily in the intellect (*per se*) and secondarily in the things as they are related (*per accidens*) to the intellect as their source. Consequently, there are various definitions of truth—namely, the definition of St. Augustine, who declares that truth is that whereby what is, is made manifest,⁴⁴ thus relating truth to the intellect; and the other definition of St. Augustine which deals with the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect: "Truth is a supreme likeness, without any unlikeness, perceptible by the mind alone."⁴⁵ As regards the two quotations taken from the *Soliloquia* of St. Augustine and cited in the first objection, St. Thomas in his reply to the first objection maintains that St. Augustine merely refers here to

the truth of things, and from the notion of this truth
excludes relation [of the things] to our intellect [*per*

York: Random House, 1945), I, 168. All quotations from St. Thomas are taken from this work. Permission to quote has kindly been granted by the publisher. The passages in the notes are the sections of St. Augustine to which St. Thomas is referring. "R. Certe hic lapis est; et ita verus est . . . et lapis non est, si verus non est; et non nisi sensibus videri potest. A. Etiam. R. Non sunt igitur lapides in abditissimo terrae gremio, nec omnino ubi non sunt qui sentiant; nec iste lapis esset, nisi eum videremus . . . Etenim si esset, verum esset; nec verum quidquam est, nisi quod ita est ut videtur: illud autem non videtur; non est igitur verum . . . Corporea nisi sensibus videri posse, an sentire nisi animam, an esse lapidem vel quid aliud, sed verum non esse, an ipsum verum aliter esse definiendum. . . . A. Verum est quod ita se habet ut cognitori videtur, si velit possitque cognoscere. R. Non erit igitur verum quod nemo potest cognoscere? Deinde, si falsum est quod aliter quam est, videtur . . . ? eadem res et falsa et vera erit? A. . . . quomodo si quod cognosci non potest, eo fiat ut verum non sit . . . R. At si dicis nihil esse verum per se, non times ne sequatur ut nihil sit per se? Unde enim lignum est hoc, inde etiam verum lignum est. Nec fieri potest ut per se ipsum, id est sine cognitore lignum sit, et verum lignum non sit. A. Ergo illud dico et sic definio, nec vereor ne definitio mea ab hoc improbetur, quod nimis brevis est: nam verum mihi videtur esse id quod est. R. Nihil ergo erit falsum, quia quidquid est, verum est" (*Soliloquiorum Libri Duo*, II, 5 [PL, XXXII, 888]).

⁴⁴ "Verbum Dei est veritas. . . . intelligit eam esse veritatem, quae ostendit id quod est. . . . et haec est Veritas et Verbum in Principio. . . . illa est Veritas quae id implere potuit, et id esse quod est illud. . . . Ut enim veritate sunt vera, quae vera sunt . . ." *De Vera Religione*, 36 [PL, XXXIV, 151]).

⁴⁵ ". . . vera quoniam in tantum vera sunt, in quantum sunt; in tantum autem sunt, in quantum principalis unius similia sunt: ea forma est omnium quae sunt, quae est summa similitudo Principii; et Veritas est, quia sine ulla dissimilitudine est" (*ibid.* [PL, XXXIV, 152]). Cf. also *ibid.* (PL, XXXIV, 151): "Datur intelligi esse aliquid, quod illius unius solius, a quo Principio unum est quidquid aliquo modo unum est, ita simile sit ut hoc omnino impleat ac sit id ipsum . . ."

accidens]; for what is accidental [*per accidens*] is excluded from every definition.⁴⁶

In *Summa Theologica* I. 14. 5, the problem is discussed whether God knows things other than himself. This question is of particular importance to St. Thomas because Aristotle in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics* makes it quite clear that God cannot know things other than himself. Hence we should expect that Aristotle would furnish the subject of the first objection. St. Thomas, however, completely ignores Aristotle and quotes from St. Augustine, to whom he imputes the statement that God does not behold anything outside himself.⁴⁷ A comparison with the original Augustinian passage in its proper context and setting⁴⁸ at once divulges that St. Thomas does not refer here to the full Augustinian passage which, after all, is only meant to demonstrate that the Platonic οὐσία could be nothing else than a thought in the divine mind. Only by removing this Augustinian statement from its proper context can St. Thomas turn it into a real objection to his own thesis. The original meaning of this passage, however, is essentially in accord with the thesis of St. Thomas. This fact is clearly brought out by the latter's own statement that this Augustinian statement "is not to be taken in such a way as if God saw nothing that was outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself . . ."⁴⁹ Obviously this solution of the first objection is already contained in the whole context and wider meaning of St. Augustine's *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, 46.

We could continue citing many more examples of such primarily conventional or ornamental quotations from the works of St. Augustine.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Pegis, I, 170.

⁴⁷ *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, 46 (PL, XL, 30). The exact quotation, however, is: "Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuebatur ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat." This passage is a classical example of St. Augustine's efforts to modify and adapt the Platonic theory of ideas to Christian teachings. For in this Augustinian statement the Platonic has turned into a divine thought. See also *loc. cit.*: "Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur."

⁴⁸ *Supra*, n. 47.

⁴⁹ Pegis, I, 142. In *ST*, I. 14. 5, St. Thomas states that "a thing is known in two ways: in itself and in another. A thing is known *in itself* when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object itself; . . . A thing is seen *in another* through the species of that which contain it; . . . So we say that God . . . sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself . . ." (Pegis, I, 142). In fact there exists no real conflict between the statement of St. Augustine and that of St. Thomas.

⁵⁰ See, for instance, *ST*, I. 104. 3, arg. 1, quoting *De Diversis Quaestionibus*,

On the whole it can be said about these conventional citations that St. Thomas does not intend really to discuss or analyze the passages. He merely deals with them in a rather cursory manner. Nor can it be said that St. Thomas alters their original meaning to any considerable extent. The very manner in which these particular quotations are presented makes it quite obvious that they are primarily stereotype citations which, in the final analysis, are, if properly analyzed, in full accord with the main doctrines expounded in the *Summa Theologica*.

Still another group of quotations from St. Augustine might perhaps best be characterized as the deliberate effort of St. Thomas to reinterpret or re-evaluate to some extent certain Augustinian statements. These re-evaluations consist in St. Thomas's attempt to assimilate particular Augustinian notions or statements to his own doctrine and method by using small interpretative corrections. In *Summa Theologica* I. 84. 6, for instance, the question is discussed whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things. Here we find a lengthy account of Plato's theory about the derivation of our intellectual knowledge both from sensible and nonsensible things. In addition, we are given a report, taken from St. Augustine, that Plato, in contrast with Aristotle,⁵¹ insists that even our sense perceptions are acquired through the intellectual soul. Plato held that

the intellect differs from sense, and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things immuting the intellect, but by the participation in separate intelligible forms by the intellect . . . Moreover, he held that sense is a power operating through itself. Consequently not even the sense itself, since it is a spiritual power, is affected by sensible things; but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, with the result that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible.⁵²

21 (*PL*, XL, 16); *ST*, I. 79. 1, arg. 1, quoting *De Trinitate*, IX, 2 (*PL*, XLII, 962); *ST*, I. 115. 1, arg. 1, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, V, 9 (*PL*, XLI, 151); *ST*, I. 14. 12, quoting *De Civitate Dei*, XII, 18 (*PL*, XLI, 368); *ST*, I. 17. 1, arg. 2, quoting *De Vera Religione*, 36 (*PL*, XXXIV, 153); *ST*, I. 17. 3, arg. 1, quoting *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, 32 (*PL*, XL, 22).

⁵¹ *Metaphysics*, A, 1, 981a2; *Posterior Analytics*, B, 19, 100a3.

⁵² Pegis, I, 806. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 184 C. This passage is found in St. Augustine, *De Musica*, VI, 5 (*PL*, XXXII, 1168). Cf. *ST*, I. 76. 3: "Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even according to organs. To these souls he referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and the knowing power in the brain" (Pegis, I, 705). See also Plato, *Timaeus*, 69E.

St. Thomas indicates that St. Augustine touches here on this Platonic opinion, by writing that "the *body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is announced from without.*"⁵³ The manner in which St. Thomas quotes St. Augustine would make it appear that the latter is completely under the influence of Plato's epistemology. But in the Augustinian original there is no definite indication that St. Augustine intended to report Plato's notions concerning this subject; he meant only to state his own particular viewpoint. In the same *quaestio* (ad 2),⁵⁴ St. Thomas insists that St. Augustine, although he repeats Platonic doctrines on rational understanding, does not really discuss here the problem of intellectual knowledge, but rather the problem of imaginary knowledge.

And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the *agent intellect* must be separate, namely, because *the agent is more noble than the patient.*⁵⁵

It should be noted here that this attempt at assimilating the Augustinian idea to the Thomistic viewpoint requires a definite reinterpretation and re-evaluation of the original Augustinian text.

In *Summa Theologica* I. 9. 1, where St. Thomas discusses the problem whether God is altogether immutable, St. Augustine is quoted in the first objection as saying that "*The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time nor by place.*"⁵⁶ St. Thomas, by emphasizing the words

⁵³ Pegis, I, 806. "Neque enim corpus sentit, sed anima per corpus, quo velut nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod extrinsecus nuntiatur" (*De Genesi ad Litteram*, XII, 24 [PL, XXXIV, 475]). Cf. *ibid.*, XII, 16 (PL, XXXIV, 467), quoted in n. 54, *infra*.

⁵⁴ The second objection reads as follows: "Further, Augustine says: *We must not think that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though the spirit were to subject itself like matter to the body's action; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that which it acts on*" (Pegis, I, 806). See *De Genesi ad Litteram*, XII, 16 (PL, XXXIV, 467): "Nec sane putandum est facere aliquid corpus in spiritu, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti, materiae vice subdatur. Omni enim modo praestantior est corpus. . ." "Whence he [meaning St. Augustine] concludes," St. Thomas continues, "that *the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit itself causes it in itself.* Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things" (Pegis, I, 806).

⁵⁵ Pegis, I, 807. *De Anima*, I, 5, 430a18.

⁵⁶ Pegis, I, 70. "Spiritus autem creator movet seipsum sine tempore ac loco, movet conditum spiritum per tempus sine loco, movet corpus per tempus et locum" (*De Genesi ad Litteram*, VIII, 20 [PL, XXXIV, 388]).

"moves himself," concludes that, according to St. Augustine, God is in some way mutable. In his reply to the first objection St. Thomas reinterprets St. Augustine by pointing out that St. Augustine there speaks

in a similar way to Plato who stated that the first mover moves Himself, thus calling every operation a movement, according to which even the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore, because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself; not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.⁵⁷

In short, the terms *motion* and *change* as used specifically by Plato and St. Augustine do not, according to St. Thomas, mean the same thing as they do with himself and Aristotle⁵⁸—*ut nunc loquitur*, meaning "as we Aristotelians would say"—and hence do not really imply, by definition, that God is subject to motion and change in the Aristotelian sense of the term. Here again St. Thomas replies to the real problem posited by St. Augustine (as St. Thomas wishes to understand it) by implying that the latter, when speaking about the movements of God, had no precise notion of the true meaning of the terms *motion* or *change*, and therefore did not really mean what he said.

In *Summa Theologica* I. 89. 7, the problem is discussed whether local distance impedes the knowledge of the separated soul. In the second objection St. Augustine is quoted as saying "that *the demons' rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us*."⁵⁹ Therefore, St. Thomas concludes, according to St. Augustine, local distance impedes the knowledge of the separated soul, an impediment which can be overcome only by the rapidity of movement. In his reply to the second objection⁶⁰ St. Thomas points out that St. Augustine

speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive

⁵⁷ Pegis, I, 71. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245C; *Timaeus*, 30A, 34B; *Laws*, 894E. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Δ, 6, 1071b37, from which St. Thomas probably took this information on Plato.

⁵⁸ For with Aristotle and St. Thomas, motion and change are the actualization of potentiality. Cf. *ST*, I. 9. 1; Aristotle, *Physics*, Γ, 1, 201a10; Γ, 2, 202a7; Θ, 1, 251a9; *Metaphysics*, K, 7, 1065a16.

⁵⁹ Pegis, I, 861. "Daemonum ea est natura, ut aerii corporis sensu terrenorum corporum sensum facile praecedant . . . celeritate etiam propter eiusdem aerii corporis superiorem mobilitatem . . . vincant. Quibus duabus rebus quantum ad aerium corpus attinet praediti . . . Per has efficacias quas aerii corporis natura sortita est . . ." (*De Divinatione Daemonum Liber Unus*, 3 [PL, XL, 584]).

⁶⁰ Pegis, I, 861-62.

powers, which require local distance.⁶¹ In the same book⁶² he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion,⁶³ as we may gather from *De Civitate Dei* XXI.⁶⁴

In other words, St. Thomas himself insists that St. Augustine never asserted these things, but merely reports them as the opinion of others. Hence the second objection is no real objection at all, at least not one which originates with St. Augustine proper.

Obviously, in these quotations from St. Augustine, which seem to contradict the various theses proposed by St. Thomas, St. Thomas is trying to prove that the Augustinian statements contain only recitations of the opinions of others and that it is not St. Augustine himself who is speaking.⁶⁵ By using this form of explanation, by reducing all these

⁶¹ Cf. also *ST*, I. 51. 1, ad 1: "It was the opinion of some that every being is a body (see also *ST*, I. 50. 1), and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united bodies (see Origen, Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, I, 6 [*PG*, XI, 170]; Pseudo-Augustine [Alcher of Clairvaux], *De Spiritu et Anima Liber Unus*, 18 [*PL*, XL, 793]; *ST*, I. 54. 5), so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (*De Civitate Dei*, VII, 6 [*PL*, XLI, 199]) . . . Augustine speaks, not as asserting a fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals which they termed demons" (Pegis, I, 492). The Pseudo-Augustine *De Spiritu et Anima*, 18, reads as follows: "Anima praesentia sua corpus vivificat . . . In vita si quidem animae consistit vita corporis . . . Omnis vero rationalis creatura corporea est . . . Ex eo enim intellectuales naturas corporeas esse dicimus . . . Sed quia per praesentiam et operationem in loco concluditur, localis et ipsa dicitur . . . Respectu vero naturae incorporeae . . . corporea est anima . . ." The *De Civitate Dei*, VII, 6, reads as follows: "Dicit ergo idem Varro . . . deum se arbitrari animam mundi . . . et hunc ipsum mundum esse deum . . . cum sit ex corpore et animo . . ."

⁶² *De Divinatione Daemonum*, 3 (*PL*, XL, 584), quoted *supra*, n. 59.

⁶³ As a matter of fact, St. Augustine in his *De Divinatione Daemonum*, 3, does not merely "recite the opinions of others," but asserts his own views on the matter.

⁶⁴ "Nisi quia sunt quaedam sua etiam daemonibus corpora, sicut doctis hominibus visum est, ex isto aere crasso atque humido, cuius impulsus vento flante sentitur. Quod genus elementi si nihil igne perpeti posset, non ureret fervectus in balneis. Ut enim urat, prior uritur, facitque quod patitur. Si autem quisquam nulla habere corpora daemones asseverat, non est de hac re aut laborandum operosa inquisitione, aut contentiosa disputatione certandum" (*De Civitate Dei*, XXI, 10 [*PL*, XLI, 724]).

⁶⁵ "Now in many things relating to philosophy, Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but reporting them" (*ST*, I. 77. 5 ad 3; Pegis, I, 727): "Augustine . . . expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion . . ." (*ST*, I. 89. 7 ad 2; Pegis, I, 861-62): "Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato . . ." (*ST*, I. 66. 2 ad 1; Pegis, I, 623): "Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists . . ." (*ST*, I. 51. 1 ad 1; Pegis, I, 492): "Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting" (*ST*, I. 77. 8 ad 6; Pegis, I, 732).

Augustinian passages to mere historical reports on certain Platonic dicta, rather than by accepting them as assertive statements, St. Thomas succeeds in removing any possible conflict between his own views and those held by St. Augustine. Such a method of explanation, however, if used too often, loses its effectiveness. Hence St. Thomas resorts to another method of reconciling the sayings of St. Augustine with his own doctrines: he simply assimilates these Augustinian statements to his own views either by readjusting them or by correcting them through reinterpretations or by altering their original meaning in order to make them compatible with his own thesis.⁶⁶

But there is also a further problem connected with this particular group of quotations from St. Augustine—the many references to the opinion of Plato and the Platonists.⁶⁷ These references are almost historical criticism on the part of St. Thomas. In this regard a passage from *Summa Theologica* I. 86. 4, ad 2, should be kept in mind.⁶⁸

As Augustine says, the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its nature it can know the future . . .⁶⁹ Such an opinion as this would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating in the Ideas, as the Platonists maintained . . .⁷⁰

This apparently innocent statement raises several interesting questions. Is it permissible to assume that in this statement St. Thomas not only recognizes the fact that in many of his notions and views St. Augustine was under the influence of a historical tradition essentially different from that which shaped his own ideas? Does it, by implication, admit that, in consequence, St. Augustine was entitled, at least from a historical point of view, to have taken a different standpoint on many problems connected with philosophy? If this is so, then most certainly St. Thomas would be obliged to concede that because they emerged from a very different historical background some of the statements of St. Augustine could never fully be reconciled with certain Thomistic-Aristotelian opinions.⁷¹ Now as long as these conflicting views of St. Augustine merely touch upon matters of little importance,⁷² St.

⁶⁶ Cf. Hertling, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁶⁷ Cf. *ST*, I. 77. 5 ad 3; *ST*, I. 66. 2 ad 1; *ST*, I. 9. 1. ad 1; *ST*, I. 51. 1 ad 1 (the "Platonists"); *ST*, I. 86. 4 ad 2 (the "Platonists").

⁶⁸ Pegis, I, 835.

⁶⁹ "Nonnulli quidem volunt animam humanam habere vim quamdam divinationis in seipsa" (*De Genesi ad Litteram*, XII, 13 [*PL*, XXXIV, 464]).

⁷⁰ Cf. Aristototele, *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 992b7; Plato: *Theaetetus*, 156a; *Phaedo*, 100D; *Timaeus*, 28A.

⁷¹ Cf. ". . . as many say now (*ut nunc loquimur*) . . .," meaning, "as we Aristotelians would say today."

⁷² Cf. *ST*, I. 9. 1; *ST*, I. 51. 1; *ST*, I. 66. 2.

Thomas could conveniently overlook and ignore them. But whenever he considers problems of great and far-reaching consequences, we cannot expect St. Thomas merely to oppose the Platonic statements of St. Augustine with an academic counterargument taken from Aristotle. For such a procedure would be contrary to the very spirit of medieval thought which St. Thomas represents. Not to take an antagonistic or unfriendly viewpoint, but to integrate these Augustinian notions into his own teachings through reinterpretation, is the avowed policy of St. Thomas when quoting from St. Augustine. And this reinterpretation, as we have already pointed out, is accomplished either by silent assimilation, editorial correction, or outright alteration of the original meaning of certain Augustinian texts.

The predominantly ornamental or conventional quotations from St. Augustine are at times difficult to distinguish from those citations which are assimilated to, and used in support of, the Thomistic argument. In *Summa Theologica* I. 88. 1, for instance, the question is discussed whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances by themselves. St. Thomas, who answers this question in the negative, starts his own argument by stating that "In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are also the objects we understand first of all."⁷³ In the first objection St. Augustine is quoted as saying, "*As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains through itself the knowledge of incorporeal things.*"⁷⁴ In his reply to the first objection St. Thomas insists, however, that "Augustine may be taken to mean [*haberi potest*] that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained through the mind itself";⁷⁵ in other words, that, analogously to the knowledge which the soul possesses about itself, it may also gain knowledge of immaterial things. By interpreting St. Augustine in this manner St. Thomas can maintain that this Augustinian statement is in complete conformity with the Thomistic-Aristotelian point of view. It should be noted, however, first, that the reference to Plato is primarily an ornamental or conventional quotation intended to indicate the dependence of St. Augustine on Plato in the matter of understanding incorporeal substances; and, second, that this type of interpretation necessary to reconcile the Augustinian position

⁷³ Pegis, I, 844. Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 100D; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, A, 9, 991b3. Compare also *ST*, I. 84. 4.

⁷⁴ Pegis, I, 843. "Mens . . . ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam" (*De Trinitate*, IX, 3 [*PL*, XLII, 963]).

⁷⁵ Pegis, I, 846.

with that held by St. Thomas alters somewhat the original meaning of the Augustinian passage.⁷⁶ St. Thomas continues his reply to the first objection by adding:⁷⁷

This [that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained through the mind itself] is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances.⁷⁸ For by knowing itself, the soul attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances . . . ; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.

The solution of the first objection is a clear instance in which St. Thomas assimilates the statement of St. Augustine to his own view by insisting that the Augustinian passage which reads "The mind gains through itself the knowledge of incorporeal things" actually signifies that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained through the mind itself. Obviously, this reinterpretation and assimilation of the Augustinian text somewhat alters its original meaning.

In *Summa Theologica* I. 87. 3, where the problem is discussed whether our intellect knows its own acts, St. Augustine is quoted in support of St. Thomas's thesis that the intellect knows its own acts: "*I understand that I understand*" (*intelligo me intelligere*).⁷⁹ But this Augustinian statement primarily asserts the actuality of the intellect and hence only indirectly supports the Thomistic contention, expounded subsequently, that "a thing is known according as it is in act. . . . Therefore the first thing of the intellect that is understood is its own act of understanding."⁸⁰ In other words, according to St. Thomas, the knowledge of substances is derived from their acts—a statement which can be inferred only indirectly from the assertion that "I understand that I understand," because this Augustinian assertion above all refers to the intuitive certainty of the intellectual life. Hence it might be said that this quotation from St. Augustine is a conventional or ornamental citation, unless one

⁷⁶ In *ST*, I. 89. 2, however, the same quotation from St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*, IX, 3, without any alteration of its original meaning, constitutes the very starting point of St. Thomas's argument.

⁷⁷ Pegis, I, 846.

⁷⁸ Aristotle, *De Anima*, A, I, 402a4. Cf. Averroes, *In I de Anima*, t.c. 2 (VI. 108v); *In III de Anima*, t.c. 5 (VI. 166r).

⁷⁹ Pegis, I, 840. "Memini enim me habere memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem; et intelligo me intelligere, et velle, atque meminisse; et volo me velle, et meminisse, et intelligere, totamque meam memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem simul memini" (*De Trinitate*, X, 11 [PL, XLII, 983]).

⁸⁰ Pegis, I, 840. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 9, 1050a36.

should be ready to admit that St. Thomas, for the purpose of assimilating it to his own doctrine by way of a novel reinterpretation, intends it to mean that our knowledge of the intellect is derived from the acts of our intellect. In short, what to St. Augustine is above all an intuitive truth, becomes with St. Thomas an inferred truth.

[To be continued]

THE NATURE AND GENESIS OF THE SKEPTIC ATTITUDE — *Continued*

VENANT CAUCHY

II. SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT AND RELATED STATES OF MIND

SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT (ἐποχή)⁶⁶

Ἐποχή is the very center of ancient skepticism.⁶⁷ The skeptic attitude is based thereon; it prompts the elaboration of the skeptic tropes and the refutation of dogmatic systems. It affords the Pyrrhonian with the means of attaining the calm and tranquillity which are of paramount importance in the troubled societies of the Hellenic and Roman worlds.

⁶⁶ Ἐποχή: ἐπί, "on"; ἔχω, "to hold" (indicating stubbornness). Cf. Boisacq, *op. cit.*, pp. 264, 302.

⁶⁷ The ancient sources do not provide a very clear picture of the suspension of judgment held by the great Pyrrhonians and Academics who preceded Sextus Empiricus.

Sextus (*Outlines*, i, 7 [I, 5, 7]) and Eusebius (*Praeparatio Evangelica*, XIV, 18 [PG, XXI, 1247A-B]) do not seem to question the completeness of Pyrrho's ἐποχή and its central position in his thought. Cicero, however, does not even refer to Pyrrho as a skeptic or as having taught ἐποχή; he seems merely aware of Pyrrho's "apathy" (cf. *Academica*, ii, 130, and Robin's explanation in *La Pensée grecque*, p. 379). If Pyrrho was not a true skeptic, but only a moralist, why did Nausiphanes, the master of Epicurus, make a clear distinction between the Pyrrhonian way of life and the principles of Pyrrho's thought which he could not accept (cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, ix, 64)? On the other hand, some texts of Eusebius (quoting Aristocles the Peripatetic) present Pyrrho's ἐποχή in a doubtful light (cf. Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.*, XIV, 6 [PG, XXI, 1246 D-47A]). According to Diogenes Laertius, the Pythagorean Numenius attributed dogmas to Pyrrho (*Lives*, ix, 68).

Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, seems to have professed Pyrrhonian ἐποχή in all its purity (cf. Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.*, XIV, 6 [PG, XXI, 1202C]: "qui Pyrrhonicus, excepto nomine, totus erat, idem Academicus

Suspension of judgment results from the equipollence of arguments in favor of contradictory alternatives.⁶⁸ Equipollence itself, as we have seen, is rooted in the diversity of phenomena which express reality to the mind. The tropes of Aenesidemus insist on the opposition of phenomena, while the tropes of Agrippa elaborate on the dialectical difficulties which stem from this opposition. The skeptics go to all this trouble, not because they consider ἐποχή as an end in itself, but because it serves as a means in achieving the tranquillity so highly valued by the philosophers of that time. The different schools, however, adopt different means to secure this end. In his study of related systems, Sextus's main point of attack consists in the nature of their suspension of judgment, which permits a certain assent or lacks universal application.⁶⁹

Ἐποχή, according to Sextus, does not result from nescience or from a naive ignorance of the problems of nature and knowledge. On the contrary, the skeptic knows so thoroughly the arguments on which the contradictory theses are based and the difficulty of preferring one to the other, that he abstains from judging. He knows the pro and con

praeter nomen habebat nihil . . ."; cf. *Outlines*, i, 232 [I, 143]). But Sextus does not have much confidence in this ἐποχή, steeped in Platonic tradition (cf. *Outlines*, i, 234 [I, 143, 145]).

Carneades's alteration of the criterion of practical assent (πιθανόν) was interpreted by his successor Clitomachos as respecting the integrity of ἐποχή; but another follower, Metrodorus, saw in it the principle of a mitigated assent. Speculative ἐποχή breaks down with Carneades's ambiguous pronouncements and the Academy goes toward dogmatism with Philo (cf. Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.*, XIV [PG, XXI, 1215C ff.]) and Antiochus.

Aenesidemus is hailed as a master of Pyrrhonian skepticism. According to Photius's outline of the Πυρρώνεια, Aenesidemus refrains from denying or affirming anything (Photius, *Bibliotheca*, 170a [PG, CIII, 695B]): "Nihil enim in universum Pyrrhonios definite [*sic*], ne hoc quidem ipsum, quod nihil definiatur". Sextus sees two tendencies in Aenesidemus, however: the Pyrrhonian, to which he is greatly indebted, and the Heraclitean, which would consider Pyrrhonism as an introduction to Heraclitus (cf. *Outlines*, i, 210-13 [I, 125, 127, 129]). Many dogmatic opinions are attributed to Aenesidemus; and in these cases, except for one passage (*Against the Physicists*, ii, 38-39; Vol. III of *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury ["Loeb Classical Library"; 3 vols.; Cambridge, Harvard University Press] pp. 229, 231) Sextus uses the expression Αἰνησιδῆμος κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον. When referring to his skepticism, Sextus uses only Αἰνησιδῆμος. With these widely divergent views of the ἐποχή of the great predecessors of Sextus, it is preferable to confine ourselves to Sextus Empiricus, the only skeptic who left a written account, still extant, of his own attitude and of the nature of his ἐποχή.

⁶⁸ "... owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of 'unperturbedness' or quietude" (*Outlines*, i, 8 [I, 7]).

⁶⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, i, 210-41 (I, 125 ff.).

better than his adversaries; for he is the only one to resort to equipollence. Those who hold one alternative develop it according to its natural consequences, without suspecting that a parallel elaboration is possible on the basis of the contradictory alternative. The skeptic has traveled both roads and for this reason falls back on suspension of judgment.⁷⁰

Both phases of the skeptic attitude are manifested in suspension of judgment. The spontaneous *ἐποχή* of the first phase follows upon the real difficulties discovered in our knowledge of things. The skeptic, however, faced with the rash assertions of the dogmatists and their ridiculous opinions on the most difficult subjects, concludes that there is a certain merit in suspending judgment; he comes to consider *ἐποχή* as a real value. This is the precise point where the first phase passes into the second. As long as man is alone with his difficulties and unable to solve them, he finds no reason to congratulate himself or to rejoice in his failings; but show him people who try to solve the same difficulties by fantastic theories, and he will consider his *ἐποχή* from another angle. It becomes laudable as opposed to dogmatic "rashness." Unconsciously the first step has been taken in the direction of systematic doubt.

Sextus does not explicitly attribute a systematic character to his *ἐποχή*, but we can easily infer it from his methods and arguments. He ridicules all forms of definition and precision; he favors a vague or indifferent use of language.⁷¹ To ward off future attacks and guard the indestructibility of *ἐποχή*, he invents the argument of the "future philosopher": if you destroy his positions and prove that suspension of judgment must be abandoned because of the evidence of a proposition, he will answer that, despite his inability to defend his stand, a future thinker may possibly destroy your argument, in the same way that all the apparently incontrovertible arguments of the past have been

⁷⁰ "Consequently we grant this point, and in fact so far are we from saying that we have not a notion of the whole object of inquiry that, on the contrary, we claim to have many notions and preconceptions of it, and that it is because of our inability to decide between them and to discover the most cogent amongst them that we revert to suspension and indecision. For if we had possessed but one preconception of the object of inquiry, then, by following this closely, we would have believed that the object was such as we felt it to be owing to that one notion; but now, since we have many notions of the one object, and these manifold and conflicting and equally trustworthy both because of their inherent probability and because of the trustworthiness of the men who champion them — as we are unable either to believe them all because of the conflict; or to disbelieve all, as we do not possess any other notion more trustworthy than they; or to believe one and disbelieve another, owing to their equality, — we are necessarily reduced to suspending judgement" (*Logicians*, ii, 332a-34a [II, 417]).

⁷¹ Cf. *Outlines*, i, 191, 195; ii, 206 (I, 111, 113, 285).

destroyed in later times. Consequently ἐποχή remains the safest state of mind.⁷²

At this stage of reasoning, the skeptic reflects on the first phase of his attitude. He observes an opposition between the latent dogmatism of his systematic doubt and the spontaneity of his original doubt. He endeavors by all means to conciliate these two phases of skepticism. With this end in view, he often corrects the natural dogmatism of language, and invents his analogies of the cathartic and the ladder.⁷³ His purpose is to show thereby the compatibility of both phases in the skeptic attitude.

Indefiniteness or indetermination is closely related to ἐποχή; if one must refrain from formulating judgments, it naturally follows that the judgment bearing directly on the essence (judgment of definition) is the first target of ἐποχή. Dogmatists claim to express the very natures of things in their definitions; the dissension which necessarily results from this supreme disorder of the mind bars them from ever attaining tranquillity.⁷⁴ Indetermination is the opposite state of mind which prompts us to abstain from assenting to matters pertaining to dogmatic inquiries into the natures of things.⁷⁵

In many texts, it would seem that indefiniteness is the principle of ἐποχή and not just a manifestation of it (see our treatment of the term *supra*). For assent bears on judgment, and definition determines the meaning of the words which make up a judgment; from the skeptic viewpoint, it is a preliminary judgment clarifying the nature of things. If the indetermination of our knowledge prevents us from defining, a fortiori we must refrain from assenting to the composition of a subject and a predicate.⁷⁶

Ἐποχή in itself may be considered as an act or as a habit. The act bears on a particular proposition while the habit is a general predisposition to the act. We can easily understand that, though the act and the habit may be found in the two phases, the act is more compatible with a context of spontaneous doubt than the habit which is hardly separable from the crystallized doubt of the second phase.

⁷² Cf. *ibid.*, i, 33-34 (I, 23).

⁷³ Cf. *ibid.*, i, 4, 206 and ii, 188 (I, 3, 5, 123, 271, 273); *Logicians*, ii, 479-81 (II, 487, 489). See also Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, ix, 76.

⁷⁴ Cf. *Outlines*, i, 28 (I, 19, 21).

⁷⁵ "Indetermination is a state of mind in which we neither deny nor affirm any of the matters which are subjects of dogmatic inquiry, that is to say, non-evident" (*ibid.*, i, 198 [I, 117]).

⁷⁶ Cf. *Against the Ethicists*, 111; Vol. III of *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury ["Loeb Classical Library"; 3 vols.; Cambridge, Harvard University Press], p. 439.

Crystallization of doubt results in a profound modification of all the skeptic states of mind. The ἐποχή of the first phase was one of anguish and despair in the face of insurmountable difficulties; the thinker suffers from his inability and strives to conquer his problems. This ἐποχή is essentially incapable of producing the desired tranquillity; the mind, before its scientific labor, is characterized by a state of imperfection and tendency. However, on examining the ἐποχή of the second phase, one perceives that it seeks out difficulties, real or imaginary, and that it confuses matters as much as possible and tries to conceal its own contradictions and sophisms.⁷⁷ It feels at home in ignorance and unsolved problems. It thrives on confusion and seeks to maintain its state of confusion. Clearly there is an enormous difference between ἐποχή in the two phases. The first is a transitory stage in the acquisition of science; the second searches for difficulties and formulates the tropes which would install doubt as a permanent state of the mind. This novel aspect of ἐποχή results directly from the sequence ἐποχή-ἀταραξία, mediated by the consideration of dogmatic rashness (προπέτεια). The skeptic, Sextus writes, sought tranquillity by an exact knowledge of truth and falsity in reality; unable to achieve his end, his scrupulous disposition forced him to suspend judgment, and, behold, there followed peace of mind.⁷⁸

Thus the ἐποχή is conscious and systematic, but the skeptics do not present it as such. They suspend judgment constantly and deliberately, but they insist on explaining their attitude on a basis of natural and spontaneous doubt.

APHASIA (ἄφασία)⁷⁹

Aphasia is the manifestation of ἐποχή in language. It seems odd that Sextus should elaborate such a notion; for to defend the impossibility of language hardly becomes a man who is writing ten books or more. We soon perceive, however, that aphasia results from an inquiry into contradictory systems.⁸⁰ The opposition is just as irreducible after the investigation as it was before; the mind has not progressed in any way.

Sextus distinguishes two meanings of φάσις, a general meaning which embraces negation as well as affirmation and a special sense which is restricted to affirmation. Naturally Sextus uses the word in

⁷⁷ See the tropes of Aenesidemus and Agrippa (nn. 38 and 48) and the five books of refutations in *Sextus Empiricus*.

⁷⁸ *Outlines*, i, 26-27 (I, 19).

⁷⁹ Ἀφασία: privative prefix ἀ; φημί, "to speak," "to say" (Boisacq, *op. cit.*, p. 1024).

⁸⁰ *Outlines*, i, 192-93, 195 (I, 111, 113).

its general meaning; to be in a state of aphasia is to refrain from affirming or denying. It is a state of mind by which we abstain from positing or rejecting any proposition whatsoever.⁸¹ When the skeptic speaks, his propositions are indissolubly bound to their contradictories; the principles which express most perfectly his attitude are those which admit ambiguous or contrary interpretations.⁸² Here, as elsewhere, Sextus repudiates all objective foundation for aphasia. The skeptic does not practice aphasia to signify that reality in itself is such as to produce this state of mind, but only to indicate that, at the moment, aphasia represents his reaction to the problems which confront him.⁸³

ARREPSIA (ἀρρεψία)⁸⁴

Sextus uses the term "arrepisia" to indicate an application of ἐποχή to human inclinations. Since man is unable to prefer one proposition to another on the level of speculation, our inclinations or practical preferences are not founded on any speculative basis. One may possibly by-pass equipollence and assent to one proposition despite the equal probability of its opposite: such are the Academics who reject speculation, yet accept a criterion of action. The true skeptic, however, has no choice but to make the logical application of his ἐποχή even in the field of conduct and inclination. Even a probabilistic ethics appears preposterous to the Pyrrhonian, because equipollence applies rigorously to contradictory enunciations bearing on subjects of morality. The good of a thing consists in its orientation to a legitimate end by the use of adequate means; but the end is inscribed in the very nature, and without knowing the nature, no one can determine the end. Hence man is at a loss to define good or bad. Under the pressure of circumstances, the skeptic can do no more than act according to the customs and traditions of his time and country.

Arrepisia is directly related to the principle of equipollence set forth at the beginning of the *Outlines*.⁸⁵ No one can be rightly inclined this way or that; we have no basis for inclining towards one line of action or another. The practical arguments in favor of one alternative are on an equal footing with the arguments which support its opposite. Thus arrepisia suppresses the expressions of preference by applying

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, i, 192 (I, 111, 113).

⁸² Cf. *ibid.*, i, 194-95 (I, 113, 115).

⁸³ *Ibid.*, i, 193 (I, 113).

⁸⁴ Ἀρρεψία: privative prefix ἀ; ῥέπω, "to incline," "to tend" (Boisacq, *op. cit.*, p. 838). For the place of ἀρρεψία after ἐποχή, see *Logicians*, ii, 332 a (II, 417), quoted in n. 70.

⁸⁵ *Outlines*, i, 12 (I, 9).

equipollence to the appetite which follows upon knowledge. Assertions of any kind are gratuitous in the eyes of the skeptics; there exists no real basis for affirmation. Affirmation always implies a certain stability which ultimately must be reduced to a knowledge of natures. Therefore, to affirm something concerning natures when they are not known in themselves requires an arbitrary act of the will. The function of arrepisia is to curb the confusion resulting from this undue intervention and to insure self-consistency.

In arrepisia, one readily detects an element which may not be explained in terms of spontaneous doubt. Arrepisia goes against the natural inclinations of man; for, even the most ignorant man among us is conscious of knowing certain general laws and principles inscribed in his being and which he violates only at the price of his integrity. It is relatively easy for the skeptic to confuse, on the theoretical plane, natural law and the conventional precisions added thereto by positive laws; but this confusion cannot be duplicated beyond a certain point in the actual conduct of life. The skeptic must contradict his innermost convictions and repress the most cogent inclinations of his nature. Manifestly this cannot be the attitude of a man in search of truth, but that of an individual steeped in prejudice, accepting his doubt as meritorious and parading it as an element of superiority. The states of mind which preceded ἐποχή may come under both phases of the skeptic attitude; the states which follow ἐποχή are inseparable from the second phase. Aphasia can still be considered under both aspects; but so far as it adds something to suspension of judgment and violates our natural convictions, it must be restricted to the second phase. Thus it turns with arrepisia in the orbit of tranquillity (ἀταραξία) which governs systematic ἐποχή.

III. TRANQUILLITY AND RELATED STATES OF MIND

TRANQUILLITY (ἀταραξία)⁸⁶

We call those things good which we desire ardently and whose contraries we avert — such things as wealth and fame and friendship. Our inclinations result in disorder; for, if we possess some of the goods enumerated, we are unhappy because we fear to lose what we possess and long to possess what we lack. We are more intensely affected by the contrary evils, and all this simply because we claim to determine the nature of good and bad. If we do know what is good or bad in itself, we construct propositions which apply our knowledge to

⁸⁶ Ἀταραξία: privative prefix ἀ; ταρασσω, θράσσω, "to trouble," "to disturb" (cf. Boisacq, *op. cit.*, pp. 942, 350).

the particular circumstances of our actions. There follows a swarm of inconsistencies in our behavior. The mind is troubled by these deficiencies and wavers to and fro according to the different opinions on the nature of good and bad; it never attains calm and tranquillity. The skeptic, however, does not pretend to fathom the depths of reality, but suspends judgment on all matters. He is not filled with anguish because he does not claim a knowledge of things in themselves. He is still subject to custom or physical necessity; but these external circumstances have a negligible effect on his interior peace of mind.⁸⁷

For Cicero, as well as for Sextus, happiness consists in security or calm and in the absence of worry.⁸⁸ Worry results from the fear that conduct will not be adequate to general standards formulated in propositions accepted as true. The fear itself originates in rash assumptions concerning the natures of things.

Pyrrhonians and Academics are not alone in their quest for tranquillity. One finds the same end in stoicism in a different doctrinal background. The stoics seek tranquillity by the possession of truth. They base their search on a fundamental confidence in the intelligibility of things;⁸⁹ there exists among beings a universal sympathy which brings them together and explains much of our knowledge. If necessity reigns in the happenings of the world, if all things are predetermined and predictable as a result of universal sympathy, the stoic must elevate his mind and will to the level of natural determinism. After explaining his dogmas, the stoic is mostly concerned with teaching how man can educate his will to conquer peace of mind (this is the leitmotiv of Epictetus's *Discourses*). The skeptic teaches how to attain quietude through the shortcomings of knowledge. The stoic also preaches peace of mind, but he makes it flow from a knowledge of the inflexible order of things. Nothing is modified by our concern and worry; what must be, will be; and the disorders of appetite make us unhappy without altering the course of things.⁹⁰

Sextus would never admit that the stoics could attain tranquillity with such premisses. Unhappiness, which is opposed to tranquillity, results from worry; and worry follows upon the belief that we are afflicted with incapacity and imperfection. The belief stems from the

⁸⁷ Cf. *Ethicists*, 142-46 (III, 455, 457).

⁸⁸ "Nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus" (*De natura deorum*, I, 53).

⁸⁹ Cf. Dom Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque* (Louvain, Bibliothèque de l'Université XXVIII, 1945), pp. 6-13.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.

goodness and badness we rashly attribute to things. The stoic, who claims to know the nature of good, is condemned to unending sadness, because he always seeks what is good in itself or fears to lose it.⁹¹ The skeptic can achieve peace of mind because he rejects dogmatic claims to the knowledge of natures. Hence the repression of fears and desires depends solely on the application of his principles to his entire life.

'Αταραξία, writes Sextus, is calm and serenity of the soul.⁹² The skeptic attitude results from a desire for tranquillity.⁹³ Even in the first phase of the skeptic attitude, the end is not truth, but the feeling of security which would stem from its possession. One can easily understand that, upon discovering another and surer means of achieving peace of mind, truth will be sacrificed for its sake. The skeptics wished to attain quietude by solving the problems resulting from the inconsistency of phenomena and noumena; unable to do so, they suspended judgment. But, by a stroke of luck, quietude followed suspension of judgment, just as the shadow follows the body.⁹⁴ Spontaneous doubt considers peace of mind as resulting from a successful outcome of investigation; this peace of mind, somewhat similar to that attributed by the stoics to their ideal sage, would respect the natural exigencies of knowledge. The skeptic peace of mind necessarily violates our natural tendency to know the truth and places in its stead a stagnant acceptance of confusion.

The skeptic resolves to suspend judgment on all things.⁹⁵ He would advise Tantalus not to open his mouth to drink or stretch out a hand to grasp fruit . . . would the pangs of hunger and thirst be less severe for all that? The skeptic may well suspend judgment on all things, but nothing indicates that his anguish would not be multiplied a hundredfold. The truth of the matter is that skepticism is not fully aware of its own duality; if it were, it would not be skepticism. It irons out the passage from the first phase to the second by pointing to the rashness of dogmatic systems which cause perturbations in the soul. The skeptic draws a certain peace of mind from the relative merit of his ἐποχή, but hardly that which results from a knowledge of truth.

⁹¹ *Ethicists*, 112-14 (III, 439, 441).

⁹² *Outlines*, i, 10 (I, 7, 9).

⁹³ 'Αρχήν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μὲν φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτήσειν" (*ibid.*, i, 12 [I, 8]).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, i, 29 (I, 20).

⁹⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, i, 205; ii, 250 (I, 121; 317, 319).

INDIFFERENCE (ἀδιαφορία)⁹⁶

Indifference in action is an exterior manifestation of tranquillity. Everyone knows the droll conduct of Pyrrho passing coldly by while his master was struggling in the mud of a swamp.⁹⁷ Zeno of Cittium (the founder of stoicism) also recommends indifference, but only concerning things which are neither good nor bad.⁹⁸ Since the Pyrrhonian skeptic does not know good and bad, his indifference bears on all things. For, to prefer one thing to another, a man must to a certain degree desire one more than the other and thus endanger his peace of mind.

Indifference appears in the attribution of a broad and vague meaning to skeptic expressions.⁹⁹ It deeply affects Sextus's attitude towards the tropes that bring about suspension of judgment. He cautions his followers not to take in a categorical sense what he says about their number or validity; it may well be that they are worthless or more numerous than he says.¹⁰⁰

APATHY (ἀπάθεια)¹⁰¹ AND METRIOPATHY (μετριοπάθεια)¹⁰²

Apathy and metriopathy complete our study of the skeptic attitude. They prepare the skeptic to deal with all the circumstances of his environment. In the course of life, some things appear attractive, others repulsive; men seek the former and flee the latter. However, since we cannot determine what is desirable or repulsive in itself, these tendencies are the fruit of illusion, and we must curb them by a rigorous suppression of all passions: this is the precise function of apathy in skepticism. The skeptic follows the common rules without indulging in opinions; that is why he can retain his apathy in the things which are subject to his judgment.¹⁰³

Apathy and indifference cannot curb all the passions; many, such as pain, cold, or thirst, do not depend on the opinions of man.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the skeptic cannot suppress his own perceptions; his eyes see,

⁹⁶ Ἀδιαφορία: privative prefix ἀ; διά, "in two," "separately"; φέρω, "to bring" (cf. Boisacq, *op. cit.*, pp. 183, 1021).

⁹⁷ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, ix, 63.

⁹⁸ Cicero, *Academica*, ii, 130; *Ethicists*, 59-62 (III, 415, 417).

⁹⁹ Cf. *Outlines*, i, 191 (I, 111).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, i, 35 (I, 23, 25).

¹⁰¹ Ἀπάθεια: privative prefix ἀ; πάθος, "passion," "affection," "disposition" (cf. Boisacq, *op. cit.*, p. 738).

¹⁰² Μετριοπάθεια: πάθος and μέτριος, "moderate," "measured" (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 630, 738).

¹⁰³ *Outlines*, iii, 235 (I, 482).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, i, 29; *Ethicists*, 149 (I, 21; III, 457, 459).

his ears hear; and, despite his apathy, he is subject to the common passions of sense knowledge.¹⁰⁵ This is the domain of natural necessity as opposed to opinion which the skeptic suppresses by indifference and apathy. Metriopathy offers a sort of compromise between the exigencies of tranquillity and the inevitable character of natural passions. Its main function is to prevent the natural passions from influencing opinion by their very violence. Even in the face of these inevitable passions, the skeptic fares better than the rest; in him, pain and misery are never needlessly amplified; in the common run of humanity, suffering increases with the fear which affects men and with the conviction that they are subjected to real evils. Sextus illustrates metriopathy by an example taken from the medical profession: often, he says quite truly, the spectators at a surgical operation faint at the sight of blood, while the patient himself is unperturbed. This common observation brings to light the increased sorrow which accrues from prejudiced principles concerning the nature of good or evil.¹⁰⁶ Sextus concludes that the skeptic may achieve at least partial happiness by suspending judgment on all matters of opinion.¹⁰⁷ Concerning things which are forced upon him, he is more capable of judging them for what they are worth,¹⁰⁸ and not by reference to a vain context of fear. Complete happiness would consist in a state of perfect tranquillity which the skeptic tends to achieve as much as is consistent with his condition: but natural passions may always intervene partially to disrupt that state.

This interest in the passions and their disastrous effect on an ordered life is a common characteristic of post-Aristotelian schools (Megarics, Cyrenaics, cynics, stoics, skeptics, Epicureans, not to mention the disciples of Plato and Aristotle who were deeply influenced by contemporary trends). It reflects, in our opinion, a false outlook on philosophy which subordinates truth to peace of mind in the very pursuit of the philosophical sciences. In skepticism, the *ἐποχή* which leads to peace of mind must be radically incompatible with the *ἐποχή* of the first phase. The efforts of Sextus to explain away this contradiction show that he was vaguely conscious of the difficulty involved in his attitude. How can a man continue his search for truth when he has found by other means that which prompted his search for truth? If he succeeds to a certain extent in conciliating both phases of his attitude (at least to

¹⁰⁵ *Outlines*, i, 13 (I, 9).

¹⁰⁶ *Ethicists*, 159 (III, 461, 463).

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 160 (III, 463).

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 141 (III, 455).

the satisfaction of his confused mind), it is only by violating the nature of language and the natural tendencies of the mind.¹⁰⁹

CONCLUSION

Throughout the skeptic attitude, one feels the constant influence of the two contradictory phases merged in an atmosphere of indefiniteness. The bitter struggle of an average mind gasping for a breath of truth in the turmoil of conflicting doctrines unconsciously changes into self-satisfaction at the thought of dogmatic exaggerations. This fundamental contradiction pervades every aspect of skepticism; to avoid dogmatism, the skeptic accepts infinite regress and pure nihilism. But his infinite regress in phenomenalism becomes all the more dogmatic despite his attempts to avert dogmatism. The only refuge left to a

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Outlines*, i, 207 (I, 123).

THE TWO PHASES OF

First Phase	Transition from the First Phase to the Second
Difficulties experienced in the knowledge of exterior reality	Contempt for myths of ancient religion and rigor of regional customs
Uncertainty concerning the process of knowledge	Προπέτεια of the dogmatists who teach ridiculous solutions to the problems of reality
Anguish	
Search	Their rashness prompts the skeptic to consider ἐποχή as a value
Spontaneous doubt	
Involuntary ἐποχή	

thoroughgoing skeptic is confusion and stubbornness; this is where Sextus leads and where he prides himself on repelling the more persistent attacks of his enemies. His rejection of consistency, his acceptance of indefiniteness and confusion are wholly consistent with his views on knowledge: aphasia and arrepesia are logical applications of *ἐποχή* to language and appetite. To emphasize in a paradox the basic contradiction of the skeptic attitude, we might say that it represents a systematic inconsistency arrived at through a rigorously consistent process of reasoning from pseudo-evidences concerning the nature of knowledge (phenomenalism) and the value of anterior opinions (anti-thesis and controversy).

In post-Aristotelian times, the moral and political instability of the world enhanced the value of security and peace of mind. The pure, disinterested outlook was gradually forgotten and replaced by a practical

THE SKEPTIC ATTITUDE

Second Phase	Composition of Both Phases in the Skeptic School
<p>Crystallization in doubt by the formulation of principles, mainly that of equipollence</p> <p>The <i>ἐποχή</i> of the second phase is aggressive; it attacks dogmatic theories and defends itself</p> <p>The principle of equipollence stifles inquiry into truth</p> <p>Peace of mind follows "by a stroke of luck" (<i>τυχικῶς</i>) from this <i>ἐποχή</i>—the main characteristic of the second phase</p>	<p>Concomitance at the price of indefiniteness and ignorance</p> <p>Reflection on the first phase and attempt to conciliate the two phases</p> <p>1) by the analogies of cathartic, ladder, fire, etc.</p> <p>2) by numerous corrections of the apparent dogmatism of language</p> <p>3) by phenomenalism</p>

end; men of all philosophical background lost sight of the primacy of the speculative or contemplative viewpoint. They subordinated truth to the security and satisfaction which follow upon its possession. It slowly became a means to an end, and not the end of knowledge. One consequence lay in the preposterous assertions of stoicism concerning the nature of man and the universe; the other, in skepticism which reacted against the brazen dogmatism of the stoics.

The Pyrrhonian experience suggests a number of valuable principles in the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. By contrast we may learn from Sextus the importance of precision and definition; we may learn also to avoid the rashness and overconfidence which hinder the cause of truth and betray alien preoccupations in the pursuit of science. Lastly we must peer into the book of nature open before our eyes and consider all others as accounts of what preceding men have achieved through their contemplation; they do not dispense us from searching, but help us in our own personal ventures in the study of nature. Philosophy is not a survey of opinions; this view can only lead to controversy and skepticism. Fundamentally there is no authority in the pursuit of philosophical truth; each must tread on his own the difficult path of science.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

THE FIRST ARGENTINE CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

OSWALDO ROBLES

The first Argentine National Congress of Philosophy was held from March 30 to April 9, 1949, at Mendoza, Argentina, under the auspices of the University of Cuyo. It was the largest philosophical convention in this hemisphere since the International Congress at Harvard in 1926. Besides the ninety delegates from the national universities of Argentina, there were sixty others, representing other South American countries, Mexico, the United States, Canada, Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, and Germany.

In the general sessions the subjects treated were philosophy and its relation to the life of the mind, philosophy and the human city, existentialism, and the human person; there were reports on present philosophical trends in Europe; and there were commemorative addresses in honor of Suarez, Goethe, and Varona, and a special tribute to Felix Krueger and Guido de Ruggiero for their work at the University of Argentina. In the special sessions a great many aspects of philosophy were taken up—metaphysics, logic, epistemology, and so on; aesthetics and the philosophy of nature, history, culture, education, and law; and, finally, Argentine and American philosophy.

The German and the Spanish delegates were the two principal groups of Continental thinkers. The Germans, almost to a man, in contrast with the Thomistic and Suarezian Spaniards, found their inspiration in the phenomenological thought of Husserl and Heidegger. The point of their message was, in substance, the prime importance of fundamental ontology and the knowledge of total existence as a basis of philosophical realism and a condition of the possibility of sectional ontologies. It is an interesting fact that one of the most outstanding Spanish delegates, the Reverend Ramon Cenal, S.J., met the Germans on their own ground and spoke on "The Problem of Truth in Heidegger." His paper was a cause of lively and lengthy discussion.

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Another outstanding Spanish delegate was Don Angel Gonzales Alvarez, a young professor at the University of Murcia and one of Spain's best-known writers on philosophy. He gave two papers, "The Entitative Structure of Man" and "The Essence of Education," which concluded with a revelation of his firm adherence to the principles of St. Thomas.

There were still other distinguished Spaniards who spoke at the Congress. Antonio Millan Puelles, a professor from Madrid, presented "The Concept of Mathematical Existence" and a report dealing with metaphysics, "An Interpretation of the Being of Parmenides." Don Jose Corts Grau, of the University of Valencia, spoke on "Axiology and Natural Law"; and Aldolf Munoz Alonso, of the University of Murcia, on "Near Transcending God." One outstanding report was "The Finite and Nothingness," the work of the Reverend José Iturrioz, S.J., of the Collegium Maximum of Oña, who dealt in part with the views of Sartre. Lastly, the Reverend José Todoli Duque, O.P., who is the secretary of the Institute Luis Vives in Madrid, gave a short but valuable paper on "The Religious Capacity of Man."

Italian philosophers gave the Congress a number of reports, two of which—Miguel Ferico Sciaca's "The Two Idealisms" and Nicolas Abbagnano's "Existentialism in Contemporary Philosophy"—were particularly good. As to the representatives themselves, they were Nicolas Abbagnano, of Turin; the Reverend Cornelio Fabro, S.J., of the Gregorian University and the University of Rome; Ernesto Grassi, of Florence; and Ugo Spirito, of the University of Rome. Of these the most outstanding for style and depth of thought was Professor Abbagnano, the masterly proponent of Italian existentialism. Father Fabro, who is also noted for his work in the field of existentialism, spoke at length, and brilliantly, on Marx and Kierkegaard. The title of his paper was "Being and Existence." Professor Grassi, besides presenting three papers, read a documented work ("Philosophy in the Humanistic Tradition") in the plenary session that dealt with the life of the spirit. Professor Spirito submitted "Problematicism," which took up the thought of Antonio Banfi.

A few of France's best-known philosophers could not come to the Congress—the Reverend Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Gabriel Marcel, and Louis Lavelle; but all of them, though, sent papers. Father Garrigou-Lagrange's was entitled "Thomistic Realism and Its Triple Foundation"; M. Marcel's two contributions were "The Crisis of Values" and "The Primacy of the Existential"; and M. Lavelle's was "The Relation of the Spirit and the World." Still another paper was

sent from France, "The Integral Duty of Philosophy." It was written by M. Maurice Blondel, who died not long after submitting it. Among the French delegates at the Congress two men were outstanding, M. Robert Aron and Professor Gaston Berger, the one for his paper "The Presence of Philosophy" and the other for "The Discussions of Philosophers."

Two of the Portuguese delegates, likewise, were outstanding—Reverend Father Tavares, S.J., and Professor Delin Santos, who took as their themes metaphysical and Suarezian topics.

North America was represented by delegates from the United States and Canada. Among those from the United States were Luther L. Bernard, of Pennsylvania State College; Helmut Kuhn, of Emory University; John E. Engelkierk, of the University of Tulane; Gustav Mueller, of the University of Oklahoma; and Walter Cerf, of Brooklyn College. Two contributions from among this group deserve especial notice—Mr. Bernard's "The Changing Standard of the Social Philosophy of the United States in the Period of the Republic" and Mr. Cerf's "Logical Positivism and Existentialism." Charles de Koninck, of Laval University, came to the Congress from Canada and gave two papers, "The Marxist and Aristotelian Notions of Contingency" and "The Nature of Man and His Historical Being."

South America of course sent a large number of delegates. The paper of Honorio Delgado (Peru), "The Human Person from the Psychological Point of View," is worthy of special mention. So too are those of Mariano Iberico (Peru)—a report on seventeenth-century philosophy—and of the Reverend Augustin Martinez (Chile)—a discussion of history from the Augustinian point of view.

As to Argentina itself, it was quite clear from the Congress that Argentine Thomism is the most valuable movement in Spanish-American thought today. And the most outstanding active figure in that movement is the Reverend Octavio Nicolas Derisi, a professor in the Metropolitan Seminary of San José and director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of La Plata. Other Argentine Thomists of influence are Professors Aybar and De Anquin and Doctors Llambias and Rossi. This is not to say, though, that philosophy in the centers of learning in Argentina is all Thomistic. There are several able and prominent philosophers who draw their doctrines from a great many sources. Such men as Professors Augel Vasallo and Carlos Astrada, both widely known in Spanish America for their important works, reflect the thought of Heidegger, Bergson, Blondel, and Marcel. All of this gives Argentine philosophy a character that is by no means

static; it is definitely and strongly marked by Thomism, but at the same time is lively and growing because of the different ways of thinking that affect it.

THE THIRD NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE

THOMAS E. DAVITT, S.J.

The third Natural Law Institute presented by the College of Law of the University of Notre Dame was held at Notre Dame, Indiana, on December 9 and 10, 1949.

The Institute was opened the first day by Richard O'Sullivan, King's Counsel, London, England, who spoke on "The Natural Law and the Common Law." In a paper as charming as the man who gave it, Mr. O'Sullivan traced the development of common law and the struggle against parliamentary encroachment. "The aim," he pointed out, "of the common law, acting in consonance with the principles of natural law, is to make free men living in the fellowship of a free community . . . the king is under God and law."

Edward S. Corwin, professor emeritus of jurisprudence of Princeton University, in a very informative paper pointed out "The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural Law Concepts." "A society," he said, "which does not concede that its members have rights which it did not create, and could not have created, is a herd, ready to receive any tyranny."

Steven Kuttner, professor of canon law of the Catholic University of America, read a paper on "The Natural Law and Canon Law," showing the part that the natural law plays in the structure of canon law.

The Institute was concluded by the reading of the paper of Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo, President of the United Nations General Assembly, who was unable to attend because of the fact that the Assembly had not adjourned at the scheduled time. General Romulo stressed the fact that while "it is perhaps premature to say that the nations are now fully aware of the need to make international law conform to natural law as the only basis for stability and order in modern society," nevertheless, "if we should examine the work of the United

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Nations we shall find in its most significant acts and accomplishments a definite tendency to make international law conform to natural law."

COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA

Collier's Encyclopedia is a new and elaborate venture of the P. F. Collier and Son Corporation of New York. The editors and publishers make the expected claim that this work is as complete, objective, and impartial as possible. Yet here is the list of departmental co-editors of philosophy: Brand Blanshard (Yale); Curt J. Ducasse (Brown); Charles William Hendel (Yale); Arthur E. Murphy (Cornell); and Max C. Otto (Wisconsin). Not one of these men possesses unusual competence in either ancient or medieval philosophy, nor in the treatment of technical subjects in Thomism. To some extent this missing competence can be substituted for by reliance on authority, as when the board chose Professor John Wild (Harvard) to write the article on Aristotle. But a rapid glance at the first seven volumes to appear shows some results of the inevitable limitations of the editorial board: the failure to obtain the outstanding authorities in several articles (for example, the absence of Professor Vernon J. Bourke's name from the article on St. Augustine); and the missing of important treatments in the use of philosophical terms (for example, the article on causality, or cosmology). It is unfortunately too late to remedy these deficiencies, but the mere fact that the work has been printed does not excuse them.

CHRONICLE

The annual Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University was given this year by the Reverend Robert J. Henle, S.J., dean of the School of Philosophy and Science of Saint Louis University and an associate editor of *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*. Father Henle's topic was "Method in Metaphysics."

Mundelein College (Chicago) sponsored a lecture by the Reverend Gerard Smith, S.J., of Marquette University, on March 7. Father Smith's topic was "Saint Thomas and the Divine Ideas."

Officers for 1950 were elected at the December meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Conference—president, Radoslav A. Tsanoff; vice-president, Eugene I. Dyche; secretary-treasurer, Edward S. Robinson. New members added to the executive committee are Cortell K. Holsapple, Anna D. McCracken, and Ian P. McGreal.

An essay contest on "The Divorce between Science and Philosophy" is being sponsored by the Institute for the Unity of Science. Points to be considered are the historical origins of this separation, its basis in particular conceptions of science and philosophy, and attempts or proposals for rejoining the two. The contest is open to any student in any college, university, or institution of higher learning in the United States or Canada, and to recipients of Ph.D. degrees given after July 1, 1947. Essays must be under 10,000 words, and are to be submitted under a pseudonym. The final date in this contest is January 1, 1951. The papers are to be sent to the Institute at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 28 Newbury Street, Boston 16.

The David F. Swenson-Kierkegaard Memorial Fellowship for the year 1950-51 will be awarded in June, 1950. Qualifications imply some previous study of Kierkegaard and the background to pursue it further; a reading knowledge of the Danish language; a religious as well as an intellectual interest in Kierkegaard; and a field of special interest. The place where this study is to be carried on may be selected by the candidate. The stipend is \$500. Applications for the fellowship should be sent to the secretary of the Fellowship committee, Dr. Paul L. Holmer, 300 Folwell Hall, University of Minnesota.

Members of philosophical societies affiliated with the International Federation of Societies of Philosophy have an opportunity to make special arrangements for the Bibliography of Philosophy. The second volume of the year 1947 appeared in February of this year; the annual volume for 1948, in May; the 1949 volumes are to come out before the end of this year; and by the end of next year the volumes will appear at their scheduled times. Members of affiliated societies can obtain the 1947 and 1948 volumes for \$2.75 (otherwise \$3.75), and the 1949 volume for \$4.00 (otherwise \$5.00).

Philosophical Studies, Vol. I, No. 1, January, has appeared under the editorship of Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars. It contains "Analysis and Real Definition," by Morris Weitz, and "Ordinary Language and Absolute Certainty," by Paul Edwards.

The Henry Regnery Company of Chicago announces the publication of a new quarterly, *Measure*. It is called a "critical journal" and will be devoted to topics of general interest on a high level. The managing editor is Otto F. von Simson, and the editorial board is composed of Daniel J. Boorstein, David Grene, Robert M. Hutchins, John U. Nef, Robert Redfield, and Henry Regnery. The subscription price is \$3.50

per year. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN wishes *Measure* success and a growing influence.

Charles Scribner's Sons announces a new series, "The Twentieth Century Library," under the general editorship of Hiram Haydn. Its aim is to interpret and evaluate for nontechnical readers those "who have most influenced the intellectual currents of our time." In February, 1950, there was published *Albert Einstein, His Work and Its Influence on Our World*, by Leopold Infeld; *James Joyce, His Way of Interpreting the Modern World*, by W. Y. Tindall; and *Charles Darwin, the Naturalist as a Cultural Force*, by Paul B. Sears. Volumes in preparation include works on Karl Marx, William James, John Dewey, Sigmund Freud, George Bernard Shaw, and Fëdor Dostoevski. Each volume will contain about 150 pages and will cost \$2.00.

The new American edition of "Everyman's Library" will begin with the appearance of ten books this spring, at \$1.25 a copy. E. P. Dutton & Co. announce that among these first ten books the following philosophical works will be published:

Augustine, St. *The Confessions of St. Augustine*. Translated, with preface and notes by Dr. E. B. Pusey.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. *The Social Contract and Discourses*. With an introduction by G. D. H. Cole.

Plato. *The Republic of Plato*. Translated, with an introduction by Dr. A. D. Lindsay.

Aristotle. *The Ethics of Aristotle*. Translated by D. P. Chase. Edited with notes and an introduction by Prof. J. A. Smith.

Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. With an introduction by Dr. A. D. Lindsay.

Mill, John Stuart. *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*. With an introduction by Dr. A. D. Lindsay.

In October, 1950, the first number of *The Philosophical Quarterly* will be published by the University of St. Andrews (Scotland) on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Club. For the time being, the journal will appear only three times a year, in February, June, and October. Subscription price is £1, post-free; each issue is to contain about 120 pages.

The University of Fribourg will offer a series of lectures this summer on the general subject of "Thomism and the Modern Mind."

L'Édition Universelle (Brussels) announces a commemorative work in two volumes, *Mélanges Maréchal*, dedicated to the memory of Joseph

Maréchal, S.J. The first volume will contain a short life and bibliography, a reprinting of six important articles, and twelve unpublished fragments; the second volume will contain a series of articles on philosophical, theological, and historical subjects by friends and admirers of Father Maréchal.

An *Index Verborum* to all the works of St. Thomas is projected by the Reverend Roberto Busa, S.J., of the Aloisianum (Gallarate, Italy). The first step of his plan is to build a complete file of all the words and all their uses; then he intends to construct indices and concordances from this file.

Russian philosophy is again becoming active, according to a report from J. Bochenski, O.P., condensed in the *Bulletin de la Société Philosophique de Fribourg*. Soviet philosophy falls into four periods: (1) beginnings, 1917-22; (2) discussions between mechanists and idealists, 1922 to January 25, 1931; (3) the period of complete absence of original activity, January 26, 1931, to June 24, 1947; (4) the period since the speech of A. A. Jdanov on June 24, 1947. Father Bochenski points out the following instances of recent activity: the condemnation of logicians in 1948; the attempt of B. N. Kedrov to mitigate nationalism and his condemnation; and recent studies on physical knowledge and general psychology.

The Reverend Joseph de Ghellinck, S.J., medieval historian and one of the moving spirits of the *Museum Lessianum*, died at Louvain on January 4. Last fall, the University of Louvain conferred on him the degree of doctor of theology. R.I.P.

The publishing house of the Society for the Publication of Sacred Books of the World in Kyoto, Japan, announces that they have begun republication of the classics and source books of Buddhism. Much of this work will simply be reprinting from the plates of the first edition, though the Cyclopedia of Buddhism has been revised. English translations of the majority of these works are at least contemplated, and some are promised for rather early publication.

A "Curriculum of Mediaeval Studies" is to be inaugurated by the Department of History, Saint Louis University, in September, 1950. The Curriculum is set up primarily to train teachers of medieval history and civilization; but there is much among its offerings which could prove very valuable, by way of background, for students and teachers of the philosophy of the Middle Ages.

BOOK REVIEWS

NEW REPUBLIC, October 17, 1949: Special Issue on the Occasion of John Dewey's Ninetieth Birthday.

PROBLEMS OF MEN. By John Dewey. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1946. Pp. 424. \$5.00.

KNOWING AND THE KNOWN. By John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley. Boston: Beacon Press, 1949. Pp. xiii + 334. \$4.00.

I

In honor of John Dewey's ninetieth birthday, the *New Republic* devoted an entire issue to his thought. Dewey's universal influence is attested by the wide range of the contributors, representing the fields of education, social work, physical science, philosophy, psychology, literature, and economics. His decisive effect upon the whole structure of modern life shows that the advice of carrying philosophy out of academic cloisters into the market place is no idle counsel. Coming to maturity in the eighties, when idealism was still the reigning doctrine, Dewey helped to create the intellectual atmosphere and institutions which in turn assured his writings the widest reception for two generations. Old age has not dimmed his capacity for inspiring younger men. This is indicated by Irwin Edman's report (in the *New York Times*) of a recent visit Dewey made to Columbia University, where he had spent over a quarter-century of teaching before his retirement in 1931. He concluded his call for a fresh treatment of philosophical questions with these words: "All it requires is some ideas, imagination and, I warn you, guts." Dewey himself possesses all three qualities in remarkable degree.

Among the *New Republic* articles, four are of special interest to philosophers: R. B. Perry's "The Influence of a First-Hand Mind"; E. Nagel's "Pure Science and Gross Experience"; W. H. Sheldon's "The Conquest of Dualism"; and Y. H. Krikorian's "The Ethics of Naturalism." Perry covers familiar ground in making a comparison between William James and Dewey. He suggests that their divergence begins when a metaphysical estimate is given of the significance of

inquiry. Is this operation primarily a disclosure of an existent world or a principle of organization of the world according to the traits of the inquiry itself? On the basis of this weighted question, Perry would classify James with realism and Dewey with idealism. He is perhaps underestimating the practical, formative side of James's philosophy; but he rightly emphasizes Dewey's continuity with an idealistic method.

In a less forthright way, the same residual idealism is hinted at by Nagel. His essay is a lucid statement of the soundest section in Dewey's program—the reconciliation of the common-sense and scientific outlooks. Dewey's preference for the physical and biological sciences is due to his instrumentalist theory of knowledge, which is less readily confirmed by mathematical procedures. This association has also permitted Dewey to integrate his version of scientific inquiry more easily with the common-sense varieties of reasoning. The very abstractness of scientific propositions gives them a measure of generalization that is relevant for guiding the whole compass of human activities. Right here, however, an ambiguity creeps in. Dewey holds that scientific objects as such are generalizations and correlations. Yet he often writes as though these formulations exist in their own right, engage in movements, and give rise to sensible qualities. Although he rules out old-fashioned notions of causality, he finds it difficult not to assign to principles of inquiry functions formerly exercised by principles of being. The familiar world of common sense acquires validity only through scientific explanation. This is the rationalistic postulate that belies Dewey's appeal to experimentalism.

II

Problems of Men is a collection of articles which, with one exception, appeared in various journals between 1935 and 1945. These essays are grouped under four headings: democracy and education; human nature and scholarship; value and thought; and studies on other philosophers. For the most part, the material is familiar to students of Dewey's earlier works. Under the pressure of criticism, however, Dewey has tried to clarify his stand on a number of issues, two of which may be mentioned.

The first point concerns the relation between philosophy and value. Despite its practical bent, science does not occupy the entire field of practical affairs. It cannot, on Dewey's testimony, settle questions concerning the value of the consequences of facts which it establishes. This office is left for philosophy. Yet philosophy does not employ any distinctive method, since value-judgments are like other judgments in

that they rely on a method of inquiry. The difference lies in the subject matter, in the direct bearing of certain ascertainable facts upon human goods and purposes. This is a tenuous basis for distinguishing between philosophy and science, since it leaves unexplained the broad adjustments needed in scientific method in order to deal with the field of values. Furthermore, it means that philosophy not only can have a moral phase, but is nothing more than moral philosophy. This accounts for Dewey's unremitting attack upon speculative philosophy. It is a stumbling block to the instrumentalist conception of philosophy for two reasons: its subject matter is both nonoperable (hence unscientific, on Dewey's standards) and not immediately ordained to matters of value (hence nonphilosophical).

It should be clear that Dewey's polemic against "speculation" is in fact a manner of self-defense. He permits a theoretical attitude on the part of the investigator, in the sense that the latter should not permit wishful thinking to interfere with his fidelity to the demands of the situation. But his generalization of scientific method as an art or practical attitude leaves no room for philosophical analysis of the nonoperable aspects of reality, including man, even apart from formal questions of human good. Dewey uses every weapon at his command—whether of scientific or unscientific status—in order to discredit attempts to break through this strait jacket.

Nevertheless (and this is the second noteworthy feature in *Problems of Men*), Dewey does not give the expected unqualified answer to his own question as to whether human nature changes. He observes that disagreement over the answer is often due to the fact that different aspects of the problem are being considered. He admits that there is permanence in man's "innate needs," "inherent demands," "constituent parts," "native elements," "fixed elements," "original human nature" (184-90). Although he goes on to distinguish between these permanent aspects and their plastic manifestations, he does not realize how much he has admitted. Granted that these manifestations change and that they may properly monopolize Dewey's own interests, he supplies no ground for limiting scientific inquiry to these aspects. Although it has been historically the case that concentration upon a study of the fixed elements often turns attention away from the changeable features and their problems, there is no intrinsic reason for eliminating philosophical consideration of fixed traits for their own sake. Such an approach to man and reality would not be exhaustive, but it would have a definite subject matter to be examined by a suitable method. The conditions for a philosophy that is speculative both in the investigator's personal atti-

tude and in the discipline itself would then be met. Once the dangers of eternalism are brought home, speculative philosophy is an aid rather than a block to practical studies of the changing aspects of human nature.

III

Dewey and his long-time associate, A. F. Bentley, have undertaken a joint research project in *Knowing and the Known*. Three chapters are written by Bentley, one chapter and the appendix by Dewey, and the remaining chapters by both authors. Starting from evidence of widespread vagueness among even the best contemporary logicians (texts of Carnap, Cohen and Nagel, Ducasse, Lewis, Russell, Morris, and Tarski are examined), the investigation aims at improving conditions at least within a limited sphere. The purpose is to advance from loose to firm namings with respect to instances of knowings and knowns. No attempt is made to give firm meaning to "knowledge," because of the danger that it might be set apart as an independent entity having no basis in particular cognitive acts and objects. This avoidance also enables the authors to interpret particular acts of knowing in an instrumentalist way without introducing their general presuppositions for critical discussion. Most of the analysis centers about the sense in which "fact" should be taken. A number of other names or naming behaviors cluster naturally around Fact. The most important of these are "event," "designation," "existence," "specification," and "transaction." A study of these namings is also made in the hope of settling on some basic usages that might facilitate communication and further research.

Far more significant than any results obtained in this inquiry are the postulations required in order to obtain results. Overshadowing the explicit postulations mentioned by the authors is a general conception of history, a cultural-historical principle of criticism. It is a thesis propounded by Dewey in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* and *The Quest for Certainty*; it has been repeated despite the efforts of Morris Cohen and others to amend it in the light of philosophical sources. Dewey still remains quite impervious to the annoying textual comments of "our most solemn and persevering remembrancers of things past—and done with" (p. 143, n. 24). He refuses to admit the criticism of the historically minded "echoists," since for him historical arguments are always to be tailored according to plans for the future. The eventual triumph of scientific intelligence and the present hindrances to this victory are his warrant for continuing to propagate the myth about the Graeco-Scholastic spectator-attitude and absolutism versus the temporalism and finitism of the scientific outlook. Since philosophy still

lags behind science, Dewey is tireless in denouncing the obstructionism of those philosophers who see another meaning and another possibility in history.

The Dewey-Bentley volume presents the same thesis in a somewhat different form. A distinction is drawn between self-action, inter-action, and trans-action. Self-action signifies the premodern view that higher beings are self-acting and perfect, whereas lower beings are increasingly passive and controlled from without. Inter-action is the transitional position of modern philosophy, which could only overthrow medieval authoritarianism by introducing dualistic agents within the material world—mind and body, self and world, subject and object. Scientific advances in physics, biology, and psychology rest upon a trans-actional theory that the components of an event must be comprised within the unity of the process under description. *Knowing and the Known* aims at introducing the trans-actional viewpoint into philosophy through a consideration of the naming of facts. Events and designations, knowns and knowings, are taken together in organic unity rather than in separation.

The authors insist several times that they do not claim greater validity or reality for this approach, but only greater efficiency in the pursuit of their chosen work and a wider basis for communication. Yet the actual tendency of the argument is to measure competent thinking by its approach to the instrumentalist-transactional norm. Although co-operative understanding may be promoted thereby between the latter and inter-actionism, no common scientific ground is left standing between trans-actionism and the self-action theory or absolutism. It is difficult to find among actual philosophies an exact equivalent for the shadowy bearer of these self-actional qualities. This doctrine is described (with the aid of the usual fearsome array of pejorative terms) as resting on hypostatized underpinnings (substance, cause, soul, subject), hidden operators (self, God), and nonobservable entities (whatever cannot be ascertained through the method of the physical and biological sciences). This is no objective description, but an implicit rejection of all communication with philosophies which maintain the existence and relevance of God and an immaterial soul. Those who hold such opinions are adjudged to be busied about that which is not worth while investigating—the kingdom of brownies and elves.

Theists should be wary about occupying the breastworks which Dewey has thrown up and which he has invited them to defend at their own risk. For to some extent they must agree with Dewey's own line of thought. He found himself at the end of a long experiment in dualistic

epistemologies. Realists and idealists had tried in vain to make their theories generally acceptable. He saw that the basic error of both groups is the elementist fallacy of starting with isolates—such as mind/body or subject/object—and attempting to synthesize these disparate entities. Dewey realized that the better course is to begin with the total situation given in ordinary experience and scientific research, rather than attempt a preliminary catalytic separation. This situation is the organismic one described by scientists such as Henderson and Goldstein, as well as by Gestalt psychologists. Recent Scholastic writers have made a similar appeal to such sources for evidence against excessive individualism and mechanism. The organism and its environment belong together in the totality of the living process. Only an artificial method will begin by cutting off this vital compenetrations, which reaches from primitive organic behavior to the highest operations of knowing and planning. The critical problem arises only when this comprehensive situation is methodically set aside.

From an admirable resolve to get behind the dichotomy of subject and object, however, Dewey and Bentley conclude that they can by-pass metaphysics. They weight the scales by describing the metaphysical outlook as one which peoples the universe with completely separate and autonomous entities nowise involved in experience, but constantly pulling strings behind the scenes. To make this account plausible, they reserve to their own philosophy the ability to draw moderate distinctions, which do not forthwith harden into gaping separations. Even in an organismic world, there are moments of uncertainty when the inquirer must discover where the difficulties lie within the total field. Hence the authors permit legitimate distinctions to be made in such problematic cases between inner and outer, private and public, self and world. But they label every noninstrumentalist attempt to make distinctions an instance of gross separation and isolation. Unless one accepts this trans-actional philosophy, self and world cannot be distinguished without being set "over against one another as inherent, essential, and therefore *absolute* separations" (p. 277). Despite the impressive "therefore," there is no attempt to justify this identification between inherent distinctions and absolute separations. It is simply stipulated that, outside of the kind of inquiry favored by the authors, all distinguishing acts must destroy the relatedness of things and petrify into utter separations.

In order to facilitate this sort of reasoning, an "experiment" has been made. The authors have transferred from the ontological order to that of logical inquiry the whole matter of trans-actional activity. Sup-

posedly, this shift of context permits the process of inquiry to set its own conditions in an inclusive way, such that valid distinctions can be drawn only and wholly within the inquiry patterned according to the standards of the physico-biological sciences. This strategy is reminiscent of Hegel's claim that distinctions are correctly made and understood only within the organic unity of his System. Dewey and Bentley have transferred to their notion of scientific inquiry the idealistic assertion of contextual sufficiency and comprehensiveness. The embracing organic situation has taken the place of the field of dialectical contradiction and tension.

The authors refer occasionally to the distinct aspects or phases of the problematic situation as participants in existence. By this is meant the sharing of a common field of extensional and durational spread by the parties in the transaction. Existence is denied, however, to everything which claims to have a nonextensional, nontemporal mode of being. This is a limitation which depends upon the universal scope of the method. Nevertheless, Thomists might like to show that the theory of participation in the existential act of being is their way of securing both interrelated dependencies in the world and distinctions within the sphere of participation. Such a demonstration would depend upon the use of a principle ruled out by Dewey and Bentley and upon the raising of a question which they prefer to suppress. The principle is that of causality; the question is that of the kind of unity or unities which can be found among the environmental and organic factors in a situation.

Both causality and the problem of unity are eliminated by declaring the descriptive standpoint to be ultimate. There are no ultimate entities in this philosophy because everything rests upon the thesis of methodic ultimacy. Once this premise is accepted, there is no need to raise the question of causal origins. The cosmos of fact can be accepted "just as it stands," "taken just as it comes," without seeing any need to explain the derivation of anything from anything. Taking man-acting-in-the-world for granted as the field of observation, there is no methodic obligation for inquiring further into the conditions which permit this situation to present itself. Similarly, this field of fact is rendered accessible to investigation as soon as its constituents are regarded as belonging to a single descriptive system. The authors make no effort to render the key terms "system" and "organic unity" firm. To leave these in a vague state is to remain indifferent to whether or not there can be other kinds of unities and distinctions than those required in order to elaborate descriptions in terms of behavioral process. But this is precisely the

issue at stake from the philosophical standpoint, since science does not pronounce upon the exclusive competence of its own descriptive systems.

Transactions as namings are unfractured observations, involving a system of description for dealing with phases of behavior. Yet because this purpose can be achieved without referring to powers and causes, no conclusion follows concerning the existing participants in the transaction as modes of being. The latter consideration may require more than is needed to complete a scientific description. Dewey and Bentley rightly ridicule the notions of a substance existing without its powers, and a power lurking detachedly behind its activities. The experiential reality is indeed man-in-action. But a theory of substance, powers, and causality need not fall victim to this way of thinking. Opposing the tendency toward hypostatization of principles of being is quite another affair than sidetracking metaphysics. It is, indeed, the surest way to render the distinctively metaphysical questions about unity, cause, and distinction more urgent than ever. The authors beg to be allowed to "cultivate the garden of our choice" (p. 60). This is only their right. But it is notorious that for *Candide* his own garden soon became the entire world. At this point, a man's castle becomes a prison, wherein he has no right to confine others.

JAMES COLLINS

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SYMBOL AND METAPHOR IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE. By Martin Foss. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 205. \$3.00.

A book such as this has long been in demand, and it is well that the book has come from so competent a source as Professor Foss. Metaphor, called *translatio* or "transference" by earlier rhetoricians, is a focal point for much current literary analysis. More than ever before, literary theory today is intrigued by this transference of a term from one object to another which allows the term, even while applying to the second object, to continue somehow to signify the first object as well.

Metaphor has two aspects. It can be regarded as suggesting that the second object is really the first, when it is not. To regard metaphor this way makes often for mere querulousness at the ubiquity of metaphor in human discourse. But metaphor can also be regarded as a process of conjunction quite at home within the general economy of human knowledge inasmuch as this knowledge is at root always a process of conjunction, of bringing one term to bear on another. There can be little doubt that the unique place occupied by metaphor among

the vivifying devices of discourse is due to the fact that the bifocal nature of metaphor, its juncture of two things to make a sort of one, is reminiscent of the structure of judgment, the juncture of subject and predicate—which, as St. Thomas explains, come together as matter and form to make the judgment an *unum per se*.

But the metaphor is more than suggestive of the judgment. In a certain fashion—which is, be it owned, a little restless and uneasy with itself—the metaphor is more compressed than the judgment since it compacts two terms in one in a way which avoids the more obvious duality of predication. Predication carries on, *componendo et dividendo*, by means of patently separate subject and predicate terms; but by its peculiar compression metaphor hints at a simpler manner of knowing than this, that exercised by pure spirits, in which the two-membered judgment is replaced, and transcended, by a simple, indivisible act. (It is interesting to observe here how St. Thomas, approaching this problem from another point, assigns metaphor a place within the science of theology because the subject matter of this science is above the range of human reason, and, conversely, a place also in poetry because here the matter is below the range of human reason. [*In Sent.*, prolog., q. 1, a. 5 ad 3; cf. *ST*, I. 1. 9.])

With a framework such as this to work in, Professor Foss sets metaphor against symbol as the living against the dead, process against sterile image. To him the chase after “ideas,” lately become rather a rat race, presents little temptation. With his attention trained on the process at the live center of human intellection—the center which St. Thomas was regarding when he insisted that we know not by concepts as such, but *componendo et dividendo*—the author conveys some wonderfully acute insights not only into human experience in general, but especially into the artistic and poetic process and into the nature of tragedy and comedy. There are some excellent observations on the resemblances and differences between art and religion and on the function of prayer, as well as on the nature of melody as against harmony. (In this last matter, while endorsing the larger point concerning the relationship of melody and harmony, I myself am tempted to quarrel with the suggestion that the choral parts of Beethoven’s *Ninth* are a return to pure melody, for these have always seemed to me melodically more than suspect—disassembled harmonies more than sheer melody.)

Because the author’s “symbol” and “metaphor” represent at one level or pitch the bipolarity which rides through all created reality, they can be made to illuminate almost anything, and are. But, without denying the author’s real achievement, one must note what happens when

this particular pitch of the bipolarity is preferred as the ultimate reduction over the potency-act, or even the matter-form, pitch. Approaching reality in terms of expression, one is engaged with being at one remove from itself. The world of symbol and metaphor is the world of (human) intellect, not of immediate actuality, no matter how much you make it come alive. And in the statement that causality is a "metaphorical process of substance" (p. 67) and similar statements, although one can see what the author means, connections have become so tenuous that the introduction of metaphor as a term of comparison appears more a tour de force than an explanation.

To process reality in terms of apprehension and expression often entails considerable reduction of field—specialization in one aspect of things to the neglect of others. Perhaps because of this reduction, the reality of ritual and priesthood is considered by the author solely as rationalistic. (What would Voltaire have said to this?) One is made to forget that these things are in fact two-sided, rationalistic or symbolically reduced insofar as opposed to actuality, but nonrationalistic or "superstitious" as against scientific statement. Hence it is that attacks on ritual vacillate, badgering it now for one thing now for the other. By a similar reduction, "analogy" seems to become mere allegory here, and "symbol" itself becomes mere representation, static image, whereas in Kafka or his commentator Brod and elsewhere, it is precisely symbol which is fecund by contrast with allegory, which is static.

Where it functions in the open, this reduction of terms is legitimate enough and, indeed, desirable. Another sort of reduction is perhaps less so. In a fashion which seems to be a vogue particularly of the past decade or so, enthusiasm sometimes leads the author to state an insight with a slight distortion which makes it play just beyond the bounds where it really belongs. This makes for exciting effects, and it keeps the reader alert. Writing of this sort is not dull, but it isn't quite fair either. Thus "contradictions" are said to be predicated of God (p. 79); but the instances given include not one single contradiction (affirmation and denial of the same thing) nor even contraries, but only paradoxes. In like manner, *creatio ex nihilo* is given quite a torque (pp. 62 and 72). Here one detects the hectic fascination with nothingness, negation, and contradiction which threads here and there through this book and more than once suggests Meister Eckhart, who does come in for his meed of praise (p. 79).

The fact that he becomes involved with problems of existence while handling them at one or two removes helps account for the author's assertion that existence is a process (p. 67) and that person is a

process (p. 35). One could well agree that apprehension of existence comes about through process, and one can understand why an approach to existence which backtracks through apprehension and expression—"experience"—would lead one to speak this way. But is not the reduction of existence to process the very *ne plus ultra* in the symbolic reduction which the author so rightly maintains cannot be ultimate? Process seems live and full of promise, but one suspects that its appeal is really based on the fact that it is a much more tractable term than existence would be.

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THE KING AND THE EDUCATION OF THE KING (DE REGE ET REGIS INSTITUTIONE, BOOK I.) By Juan de Mariana. An English Translation and Criticism by George Albert Moore. Washington: Country Dollar Press, 1948. Pp. xxiii + 440. \$5.00.

The sixteenth century is of crucial importance in the formation of modern political thought. If it is true that the structure of sixteenth-century political thought is still medieval, the quality of the thought is not so certain. One may fairly say that the world of political ideas was in an unstable and momentary equilibrium which was to be destroyed by the introduction of the notions of absolute royal rule and the right to resist. The defenders of the right of resistance, both Catholic and Protestant, sought naturally to elaborate a theory of the people's right which should derive political authority from the people. This was, of course, a traditional doctrine; but the significant thing about the sixteenth-century tracts dealing with this matter is their prolix, poor, ambiguous, and superficial statement of it. There emerges from the literature the primacy of the natural man as the most fundamental moral fact: the innate social propensity of man is raised to the level of a sufficient explanation of social groupings in such a way that later, with the seventeenth-century theoreticians, no law is left to be observed which the moral subject has not given to himself. This has been called the "nontheological view of civil society," and many authors credit Juan de Mariana with this view. The notion of a nontheological natural law is self-evidently meaningless to those who understand the terms; but it has, nonetheless, if we may speak in the style of St. Thomas, a *historical* meaning for the ignorant.

Now it is clear that a distinguished Jesuit like Juan de Mariana could not possibly have held this ridiculous notion; however, the task that Juan de Mariana faced was that of destroying the divine-right-of-kings theory with its utterly false explanation of the origin of political authority; and it was natural that in pursuing this task Mariana should have emphasized the rational, voluntary element in the origin of political society. In view of the complexity of the traditional doctrine, and particularly in view of the subsequent development in the eighteenth century of the "natural right" theory of the state, one would expect that a critical introduction to Mariana's treatise would provide the distinctions necessary for an evaluation of his work in relation to the theories of his contemporaries and immediate successors. The various senses of the term "nature" are of utmost importance. There is a sense, for example, in which it is true to maintain, with Rousseau and Hobbes, that political society is not natural: not in the sense that it does not respond to an inclination, to the perfection of the nature of man, but in the sense that it is not brought into being without the reason and the free will applying themselves in its establishment. On the other hand, political society is natural: not in the sense that the reason and free will are not needed for its establishment, but in the sense that it responds to the inclination, to the demand and the perfection of nature. And what is nature? Basing himself on Aristotle's demonstration in the second book of the *Physics*, St. Thomas is able to define nature as "a reason put in things by the divine art so that they are able to act for an end."

In his introduction to the *De Rege*, Dr. Moore avows his intention of "relating Mariana to his time . . . and the flow of political thought in written history"; but this purpose is carried out in the most unclear and eclectic fashion because the author has not first related Juan de Mariana to the past tradition. It is extremely difficult to discover what Dr. Moore's estimate of Mariana is: here, he says, he is like Aristotle, and here, like Rousseau; here like Hobbes, and here like Machiavelli. I am not saying that these comparisons are useless, but from the point of view of a critical study they are rather so. Dr. Moore says in one place that "Mariana might be considered as a link between the schoolmen and Althusius, Grotius and Hobbes in the transition from natural law to inductive, scientific political thinking." Are we to understand that Mariana is subtly relinquishing natural law? If so, the subtlety seems to consist in a "nontheological view" of natural law, for Dr. Moore approvingly quotes J. W. Allen as saying that "it is perhaps significant that for [Mariana] the inner light by which we know right from wrong was *vox naturae* rather than *vox Dei*." On the other hand,

Dr. Moore seems also to subscribe to the view that Mariana was one of those "who represent a genuine and purposeful intrusion of God into politics"; at least, he says, this view is not entirely wrong. The ambiguity is oppressive.

The translation and the introduction undoubtedly represent tremendous labor. And the voluminous footnotes provide very valuable source materials for the knowledge of Mariana's contemporaries.

CHARLES N. R. MCCOY

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MEANING AND NECESSITY. By Rudolf Carnap. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. viii + 210. \$5.00.

It is the hope of the logical-positivist group to bring about the unity of all sciences. Their main effort along this line has been through a logical study of language. In this way they hope to remove all ambiguities in scientific language, eliminate all meaningless expressions, and clarify all confusions. Their attention has therefore been concentrated on an exposition of meaning in language. The present work of one of their leaders is a serious attempt to clear the ground for the further investigations and syntheses required in a universal science.

The book is divided into two parts, in the first of which Carnap explains and defends his new method of semantical analysis of meaning. In the second he tries to dispel the confusions in modal logic concerning necessity, contingency, possibility, impossibility, and so forth. The first part of the study is by far the more important, since it attempts to settle the difficulties which have developed in semantical analysis. Carnap's new method, called that of extension and intension, intends to bypass these difficulties, which arose, he says, because older methods were based on the name relation. By certain readjustments in the logical concepts of class and property, and by redefining certain elements, Carnap tries to construct a completely unambiguous notation for logical analysis.

He discusses at length the methods of Frege, Church, Russell, and Quine, all of which are based on the name relation. He shows that this relation leads to complications and unnecessary restrictions in the application of meaning analysis. He claims that his new method avoids any presuppositions about the entities corresponding to intension and extension, but reduces them merely to ways of speaking.

The book is technical, mathematical, and unnecessarily pedantic in the invention of new words, such as intension and extension, and in the employment of symbolic notation. The reviewer believes that in

spite of all the quasi-mechanical rearrangements of the logical empiricists they never will be able to invent a system which will be completely unambiguous until they attack squarely the problem of the nominatum. It does little good to call in an "entity" and to deign to consider it as a "given." We want to know whence it came and why. If it were not for the nominatum, a name would have nothing to name. Perhaps some day it will be clear that the direct mental correspondent to a name as sign is not susceptible of mathematical or quasi-mathematical treatment.

WILLIAM M. KEGEL, S.J.

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THE ATMOSPHERES OF THE EARTH AND PLANETS. Edited by G. P. Kuiper. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. viii + 366. \$7.50.

THE FACE OF THE MOON. By Ralph B. Baldwin. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. xiv + 239. \$5.00.

The Sphere of SACROBOSCO AND ITS COMMENTATORS. By Lynn Thorndike. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. x + 496. \$10.00.

These three books will, from a number of points of view, interest astronomers. They will also interest the philosopher of science.

The first volume listed contains the revised papers of those who contributed to the "Symposium of Planetary Atmospheres" sponsored by the University of Chicago in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the Yerkes Observatory. This symposium served the very useful purpose of bringing together, in a single discussion group, meteorologists, high-altitude specialists, and astronomers, for the purpose of a sharing of recently acquired knowledge. Astronomers especially should benefit from this opportunity to make contact with the latest findings of meteorologists and the high-altitude specialists to whom we owe most important advances in our factual knowledge of conditions in high levels of the earth's atmosphere.

The volume, which is technical, is completed by the inclusion of no less than sixteen fine plates representing, for the most part, various spectra. The papers present a good view of science in action, especially of the quite normal reasoning processes which underlie the observational and experimental activity of scientists. This is the kind of text which will be useful in bringing Meyerson's analyses of scientific explanation up to date with recent examples.

Ralph Baldwin, who is an astronomer of high standing, has written a fascinating book about our moon, for which reason one may pardon him for speaking about the "doldrums of the Dark Ages" (p. 4). If only because of what we do know about the intellectual life of Europe from the ninth to the fourteenth centuries, that sort of metaphor might well be left buried along with the ineffable Draper.

The great interest of this book, which is written well and draws the reader on—with increasing tension, through long statistical analyses, to the dramatic conclusion of pages 210-16—lies in its presenting a fine example of the methodical and accurate working out of a hypothesis about the origin of the well-known surface features of the moon.

Mr. Baldwin adopts the hypothesis of meteoritic impact. He concludes:

The meteoritic-impact theory of the origin of lunar structures is certainly sufficient to explain the observed characteristics. It probably is necessary also. The choice lies between a demonstrated process and one which has no basis in earthly experience (p. 216).

Students of the philosophy of science will find this text a grand one to work over for an understanding of the process by which a hypothesis is verified. In addition, they will gain from their reading a rather complete account of what men know about the moon.

Professor Thorndike's fine work of scholarship should find a place in every library, especially in libraries which include a good medieval section. The volume contains, in addition to a critical introduction, both the text and translation of *The Sphere*, the text and translation of the commentary of Robertus Anglicus, the text of the commentary attributed to Michael Scot, the text of Cecco d'Ascoli's commentary, the texts of some anonymous glosses, and five appendices which include further hitherto unpublished material. The work is completed by a general index, an index of manuscripts, and an index of *incipits*. Full honor has been done to the author of the manual of astronomy which was most widely used from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries in the European universities.

The book will interest historians of science, scholars who are interested in the literary forms used by the Schoolmen, educationalists, and historians of the religious teaching orders.

BRIAN COFFEY

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EVOLUTION AND PHILOSOPHY. By G. H. Duggan, S.M. Wellington, N.Z.: A. H. and A. W. Reed, 1949. Pp. 227. 12s. 6d.

This comprehensive and well-documented study is divided into three parts. In the first part, the author considers evolutionary philosophies and rejects them, to propose instead the metaphysics of St. Thomas. The treatment of Bergson in this section is somewhat unsatisfactory, though the criticism leveled against the notion of uncaused becoming is just.

In the second part, the origin of life is considered. Here the author considers the distinction between living and nonliving things, and the differences between plants, animals, and men. He concludes that it is strictly impossible that a living thing should have arisen from the nonliving merely through the causality of the nonliving factors involved.

In the third part, the origin of diversity among plants and animals is discussed. This is the longest and most satisfying part of the book. The author gives an excellent summary of the various evidences, comprehensive in spite of its brevity. He then compares this evidence with the theories of "extreme evolutionism" (the origin of all forms of life from nonliving matter by purely material processes), "moderate evolutionism" (polyphyletic evolution), and "fixism." He decides that the only probable opinion is that of moderate evolutionism.

Considering the systems that attempt to account for evolutionary changes, the author treats of Darwinianism and neo-Darwinianism, Lamarckianism, and mutationism. He shows that the evidence is wholly against any theory of infinitesimal continuous change. On the other hand, no one has yet shown any evidence that the kind of large-scale mutation required by the theory has ever actually occurred. But the theory of mutation is at least not improbable.

The author concludes that moderate evolutionism by way of sudden mutation is the correct explanation of the diversity within the large groups of living things. The large groups themselves have arisen by a special intervention of God.

Two points with which the author does not clearly deal would have rounded out his discussion. In the first place, he has not explicitly explained how his theory of modification through descent fits in with his principle of causality. He seems therefore to have left his metaphysics somewhat in the lurch. In the second place, though he is fully aware that the special intervention of God which he demands is neither a miracle nor creation in the strict sense of that word, he does not seem explicitly to have considered the instrumental function of secondary causes in this matter. Had he done so, he would have seen that the

evolutionary theory is a philosophically possible account of the diversity of living things, up to, but not including, the human soul (for there can be no instrumental causes in the creation of the soul).

There is a good bibliography and an index.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

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LUMIERE ET SAGESSE. By Lucien Roy, S.J. Montreal: Studia Collegii Maximi Immaculatae Conceptionis, 1948. Pp. 299. \$3.00.

The present work constitutes the sixth volume in the series of studies dealing with philosophy, theology, and church history which are published by the Jesuit faculty at the College de l'Immaculée Conception of Montreal. Its purpose is to study the mystical grace or mystical theology in St. Thomas. The method of the author is admirable. It attempts to recapture the living thought of St. Thomas and to evaluate it here and now for the reader in terms of a pulsating psychological experience. It is at the opposite pole from cut-and-dried conceptual analysis. It attempts to retain what was obscurely hinted at, yet not clearly defined, in St. Thomas. The author unconsciously feels that the language of St. Thomas is not merely conceptual, but is charged with feeling, attitudes, gestures. He rigorously restrains himself from synthesizing where St. Thomas did not do so, nor does he seek answers to problems not proposed by the saint himself. Hence there is no solution to the modern controversial problem of the vocation of all to the mystical state.

The study revolves around the notions of contemplation, gifts of Holy Spirit, light, and wisdom. Contemplation is found to be compounded of knowledge and love; and the mystical life is essentially mystical contemplation, or the light of wisdom.

Essentially we have here an attempt to recapture fully and in as perfect a manner as possible the highest speculative life of St. Thomas on its highest plane, that of mystical contemplation. If defect there is in the book, it is due to the highly literary style. There is perhaps too much metaphor and finesse in the composition, so that in many places one has the impression of reading prose poetry. It could, however, be that only such use of language can adequately recapture Thomistic thought on such a sublime level.

WILLIAM M. KEGEL, S.J.

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EPISTEMOLOGIA. By Franco Amerio. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1948. Pp. 453.

LA VITA, LE OPERE, I TEMPI DI EDOARDO HERBERT DI CHERBURY. By Mario M. Rossi. Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1947. 3 vols.

Vol. I, pp. ix + 599; Vol. II, pp. 544; Vol. III, pp. 598.

IL PENSIERO MODERNO. By Michele F. Sciacca. Brescia: La Scuola Editrice, 1949. Pp. viii + 256.

These three books are among the more noteworthy recent Italian publications. Father Amerio's *Epistemology* fills a major gap in the contemporary Scholastic treatment of the theory of knowledge. Most treatises are primarily concerned either with the theoretical issues or with the comparative history of Scholastic solutions. After surveying the ancient and medieval theories of cognition in two brief chapters, Amerio devotes the major portion of his study to a historical account of the modern schools. This orderly, well-informed, and objective analysis provides the requisite historical background for grasping the issues of our own day. Well-chosen quotations from primary sources and extensive bibliographical references to Italian, German, French, and English secondary studies will be of genuine aid to students approaching this matter for the first time. Special emphasis is laid upon the contribution of practising scientists, from Galileo to Einstein, to the epistemological question. Removing Cassirer's idealistic bias, Amerio nevertheless highlights the influence of scientific method upon problems of knowing.

Professor Rossi, now a member of the Italian Department in the University of Edinburgh, has long been familiar with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English intellectual history. In bringing his mature scholarship to bear upon Lord Herbert of Cherbury, he spent eight years of research in libraries and private collections in England and on the Continent. He has written the definitive account of Herbert's life, works, and times. There is an exhaustive treatment of the *De Veritate* (including numerous references to St. Thomas's treatise of the same title) and the deistic religious tracts. Herbert's intricate relations with the various contemporary currents in philosophy, politics, and poetry are traced out and placed in perspective. It is suggested that Kierkegaard's attack on religious rationalism delivered the *coup de grâce* to deism. The study is rounded out by two hundred pages of documents and bibliography (including manuscript sources and secondary works on Herbert).

Quite another tendency is displayed in Professor Sciacca's book. It is a collection of brief essays which takes its point of departure in various

modern systems, but which displays above all a speculative interest. The book is dedicated to Gentile, whose idealistic doctrine provided Sciacca with his earliest philosophical formation. After turning to Christianity, Sciacca came to discover another modern tradition reaching from Pascal and Vico to Ollé-Laprune and Blondel. These essays have as a common theme the interplay and ultimate antagonism between "the two idealisms," Hegelian and neo-Augustinian. Sciacca's itinerary is representative of the development of an important group of Italian Catholic philosophers. Their movement has been from Croce and Gentile to spiritual realism rather than to Thomism.

JAMES COLLINS

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

An Arab Philosophy of History. Selections from Ibn Khaldun. Translated by Charles Issawi. Forest Hills, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts; Spring, 1950. \$1.50.

ARISTOTLE. *Ethics.* Translated by D. P. Chase. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; March, 1950. \$1.25.

———. *Prior and Posterior Analytics.* Revised with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 700. \$8.00.

ARMSTRONG, ARTHUR HILARY. *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1949. Pp. 257. \$3.25.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *The Confessions.* Translated by E. B. Pusey. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; March, 1950. \$1.25.

BEARDSLEY, MONROE. *Straight Thinking.* New York: Prentice-Hall; May, 1950.

BRIDGMAN, P. W. *Reflections of a Physicist.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; April, 1950. \$5.00.

———. *The Nature of Physical Theory.* New York: Dover Publins., 1949. Pp. 144. \$2.25.

BRINTON, CRANE. *English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century.* (American edition.) Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 320. \$3.50.

CAHN, EDMOND N. *The Sense of Injustice. An Anthropocentric View of Law.* New York: New York Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 186. \$3.50.

CARNAP, RUDOLF. *Logical Foundations of Probability.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; July, 1950. Pp. 680. \$12.50.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Problem of Knowledge.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; April, 1950. \$5.00.

CICERO. *Brutus. On the Nature of the Gods. On Divination. On Duties.* Translated by Hubert McNeill Poteat, with an introduction by Richard P. McKeon. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. 661. \$6.00.

This is another of the "Chicago Editions" of classics which are not easily available, and for which all scholars and educated men are deeply grateful to the editors and the Press.

The translations by Professor Poteat are carefully and at times elegantly done. Essential references and explanations are given in notes at the end of the translation; there is an adequate index.

The introduction by Professor McKeon (pp. 1-65) is useful and discusses the philosophy of Cicero in all its branches. In one sense, to speak of the "philosophy" of Cicero at all implies somewhat of a Ciceronic view of philosophy as the critical discussion of the opinions of philosophers. A further consideration of the thought of Cicero as organized by the principles of rhetoric itself would throw more light on Cicero's mind and methods.

COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL. *Reason and Law. Studies in Juristic Philosophy.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950. Pp. 211. \$3.50.

CROCE, BENEDETTO. *My Philosophy, and Other Essays on the Moral and Political Problems of Our Time.* Selected by R. Klibansky. Translated from the Italian by E. F. Carritt. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 240. \$3.00.

CROSSMAN, RICHARD HOWARD STANFORD (ed.). *The God That Failed.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1949. Pp. 278. \$3.50.

DANTE ALIGHIERI. *La Divina Commedia.* With English translation by Harry Morgan Ayres. Vol. I, *Inferno.* New York: S. F. Vanni, 1949. \$3.50.

DAUGERT, STANLEY MATTHEW. *The Philosophy of Thorstein Veblen.* New York: King's Crown Press, 1950. Pp. 142. \$2.25.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *Religion and the Rise of Western Civilization.* New York: Sheed & Ward; Feb., 1950. \$3.75.

DE LUBAC, HENRI, S.J. *The Drama of Atheist Humanism.* New York: Sheed & Ward; Feb., 1950. \$4.00.

DREIKURS, RUDOLPH R. *Fundamentals of Adlerian Psychology.* New York: Greenberg Publisher; March, 1950. \$2.00.

EINSTEIN, ALBERT. *The Meaning of Relativity.* 3rd ed. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 150. \$2.50.

The third edition of Professor Einstein's well known *Meaning of Relativity* contains, in addition to the matter of the second edition, a second appendix (pp. 133-47) in which the distinguished physicist gives his first full presentation of his new "Generalized Theory of Gravitation." [*To be reviewed*]

———. *Out of My Later Years.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; April, 1950. \$4.75.

ELLIS, M. B. *Julie or La Nouvelle Héloïse. A Synthesis of Rousseau's Thought.* Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1950. Pp. xxvii + 209. \$3.85.

FARBER, MARVIN (ed.). *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States.* Buffalo: Univ. of Buffalo. Pp. 770. \$7.50.

FERM, VERGILIUS (ed.). *Forgotten Religions.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xv + 392. \$7.50.

This symposium by experts in various primitive religions (ancient and a few modern varieties) should be valuable as an auxiliary text in courses on the philosophy of religion, as well as courses in ethnology, cultural history, and related fields.

A generation ago many writers in this field adopted the smug and patronizing attitude that saw in religion merely a passing reaction of simple folk, a reaction that was at a higher stage of civilization replaced by philosophy, which in its turn was replaced by science. It is an encour-

aging sign that this attitude is no longer in evidence in the contributors to this volume. Instead, they seem to be concerned about understanding and appreciating the real functions of the religions they study.

Two defects are still rather commonly seen. The first is that religion is treated as an affair of emotion, sentiment, or experience. The second is that Christianity is put on a level with other religions because they all make a *claim* to having been revealed. Such a claim of course has some pertinence; but the important point is rather its verifiability.

- FIELD, G. C. *The Philosophy of Plato*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 219. \$2.00.
- FITZPATRICK, E. A. *How to Educate Human Beings*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; May, 1950. \$4.00 (approx.).
- FLEMING, DONALD. *John William Draper and the Religion of Science*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; April, 1950. \$2.50.
- FRANK, PHILIPP. *Relativity—A Richer Truth*. Boston: Beacon Press; Feb., 1950. Pp. 128. \$2.00.
- GARDINER, HAROLD C. *The Great Books: A Christian Appraisal*. Vol. II. New York: Devin-Adair Co.; May, 1950. \$2.75.
- GILBY, THOMAS, O. P. *Phoenix and Turtle. The Unity of Knowledge and Being*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; May, 1950. \$3.75.
- GREEN, WILLIAM M. *Initium Omnis Peccati Superbia. Augustine on Pride as the First Sin*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1949. Pp. 25. Paper, 50¢.
- GROTIUS, HUGO. *The Law of War and Peace*. Translated from the Latin by Louise R. Loomis. Introduction by P. E. Corbett. New York: W. J. Black, 1949. Pp. 491. \$2.89.
- HANEY, LEWIS HENRY. *History of Economic Thought. A Critical Account of the Origin and Development of the Economic Theories of the Leading Thinkers in the Leading Nations*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 1018. \$5.00.
- HARRIS, JULIAN. *The Humanities: An Appraisal*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press; April, 1950. \$2.75.
- HAWKINS, D. J. B. *The Essentials of Theism*. New York: Sheed & Ward; March, 1950. \$2.25.
- HEIDEGGER, MARTIN. *Existence and Being*. With an introduction by Werner Brock. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949. Pp. 399. \$5.00.
- The publishers have done another service, not only to professional philosophers, but to all serious thinkers, in making this book available in an American edition. The book contains translations of four of Heidegger's essays: "Remembrance of the Poet," "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (translated by Douglas Scott), "On the Essence of Truth," and "What Is Metaphysics?" (translated by R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick).
- The lengthy introduction by Professor Brock is in two parts. The first part (pp. 20-131) is an introduction to the life, works, and thought of Heidegger, focusing on *Sein und Zeit* as a key text. This is a difficult section, and, because of its compression, seems somewhat over-systematic. However, it is still a good account of the German philosopher's ideas. The second part of the introduction (pp. 132-248) is excellent; it is simpler and can be understood by anyone who has even an ordinary background in the history of philosophy.
- HUGHES, H. STUART. *An Essay for Our Times*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. Pp. 196. \$2.75.
- INFELD, LEOPOLD. *Albert Einstein*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950. Pp. 131. \$2.00.

This is the third volume in Scribner's "Twentieth Century Library," whose purpose is to give a presentation of the most influential ideas of the century and a picture of their authors; their intended audience is not restricted to the specialists in the field.

Professor Infeld is in many ways admirably suited to give this somewhat simplified exposé of the theories of Professor Einstein. The philosophical aspects of relativity are here stressed, and some philosophical consequences are drawn (for example, about the nature of philosophy) which go beyond the premises. [To be reviewed]

JACKSON, HOLBROOK. *Dreamers of Dreams. The Rise and Fall of Nineteenth Century Idealism.* New York: Farrar, Straus & Co., 1950. Pp. 283. \$3.50.

KALLEN, HORACE M. *Education of Free Men.* New York: Farrar, Straus & Co. \$5.00.

———. *Patterns of Progress.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 87. \$1.75.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *The Philosophy of Kant.* Edited and translated by Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Modern Lib., 1949. Pp. 526. \$1.25.

KAPP, K. WILLIAM. *The Social Costs of Private Enterprise.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; May, 1950. \$4.50.

KUBIE, LAWRENCE S. *Practical and Theoretical Aspects of Psychoanalysis.* New York: International Universities Press, 1950. Pp. 269. \$4.00.

LE BOUTILLIER, CORNELIA GEER. *American Democracy and Natural Law.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Jan., 1950. Pp. vi + 204. \$3.00.

LEPLEY, RAY (ed.). *Value. A Cooperative Inquiry.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 496. \$6.00.

LEVI, CARLO. *Of Fear and Freedom.* Translated from the Italian by Adolphe Gourevitch. New York: Farrar, Straus & Co. Pp. 154. \$2.75.

LIPSET, S. M. *Agrarian Socialism. A Study of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; June, 1950. Pp. 544. \$5.00.

LONG, HANIEL. *A Letter to St. Augustine, After Re-Reading His Confessions.* New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1950. Pp. 245. \$2.75.

LUCRETIVS. *Of the Nature of Things.* Translated by Wm. Ellery Leonard. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; March, 1950. \$1.25.

———. *On the Nature of Things.* Translated by W. Hannaford Brown. New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press; April, 1950. Pp. 288. \$5.00.

MATCHETTE, FRANKLIN J. *Outline of a Metaphysics.* With an introduction by William H. Matchette. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. xiv + 108. \$3.75.

This is a presentation of an absolute-relative theory of being, whose argument seems to be adapted from Leibniz, in a terminology reminiscent of F. H. Bradley; the atomic theory of matter, and a form of evolutionism are parts of the theory. Experience presents us with a relative world, which as relative implies an Absolute; the Absolute is likewise said to imply the relative, at least in a primordial form as atom. The book is an interesting attempt to escape from some of the impasses of modern thought, and possesses value as testifying to an interest in philosophy among nonprofessionals.

McEWEN, WILLIAM P. *Enduring Satisfaction.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. xxiii + 370. \$4.75.

This book is intended to serve as a basic understanding and orientation of life; the author suggests that it could serve as a course in personal

orientation. As his guides in building up this philosophy of life, the author has used mainly Whitehead and Brightman. The discussions of religion seem to imply that the author himself professes a desupernaturalized Christianity. This is to be expected in a theory that can look with favor on the inherently contradictory notion of a "god" that is in the process of becoming.

McFADDEN, CHARLES JOSEPH. *Medical Ethics*. 2d ed. Foreword by Fulton J. Sheen. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis, 1949. Pp. 457. \$3.50.

Mediaeval Studies. Volume XI, 1949. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949. Pp. 307. \$5.00.

In this volume, Doctor Étienne Gilson continues his study of Duns Scotus with an article on "L'Existence de Dieu selon Duns Scot" (pp. 23-61). As a kind of sequel to the text study which M. Gilson presented in last year's volume, he here devotes himself to a painstaking analysis of a further series of texts in the *Opus Oxoniense*, dealing with the First Being, the Infinite Being, and the unicity of the Infinite Being.

The edition of the *Liber de Anima* of William of Vaurouillon, O.F.M., begun in the previous volume, is completed here by the publication of the third book. Fr. Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., the editor, adds some remarks on the *De Potentiis Animae*.

The report of the doctoral thesis of the Reverend J. Owens, C.S.S.R., is an extremely interesting and provocative summary which will lead every reader who is interested in Aristotle or in medieval philosophy ardently to desire the publication of this study. The Reverend Armand Maurer, C.S.B., briefly discusses a manuscript in the tradition of the *Metaphysics* of Siger of Brabant. Other studies of interest for philosophers are "L'Enseignement de la Philosophie Morale au XIIe Siècle," by Philippe Delhay and "Peter Cantor's View on Ecclesiastical Excommunication," by N. M. Haring, S.A.C.

MILL, JOHN STUART. *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government*. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; March, 1950. \$1.25.

MØLLER, CHRISTIAN, and RASMUSSEN, EBBE. *The World and the Atom*. Foreword by Niels Bohr. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 192. \$2.50.

NELSON, BENJAMIN N. *The Idea of Usury*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. xxi + 258. \$3.00.

The doctrine of usury is here studied in relation to the prohibition in Deuteronomy; the period covered extends from the time of St. Ambrose to the present. In connection with this idea, the author touches on the notions of brotherhood, community, society, and law. There is a bibliography of 64 pages, and three detailed indices—of names, subjects, and scripture passages. [To be reviewed]

OSGNIACH, AUGUSTINE J., O.S.B. *Must It Be Communism?* With three chapters comprising Part Four by Jerome L. Toner, O.S.B. New York: Joseph F. Wagner. \$5.00.

PARMELEE, MAURICE. *Geo-economic Regionalism and World Federation*. New York: Exposition Press, 1949. Pp. xi + 137. \$2.50.

The author of this book feels that as long as the member states of any world organization keep complete sovereignty, no lasting peace can be established. He proposes that the world federation be divided into regional subdivisions, to be made on the basis of geography, resources, and population. There are to be regional authorities, which are to have control over the resources, manufacturing, communications, and so forth, of each region.

- PERRY, RALPH BARTON. *General Theory of Value*. (Re-issue) Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 702. \$7.50.
- PLATO. *The Republic*. Translated by Dr. A. D. Lindsay. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; March, 1950. \$1.25.
- PRIOR, A. N. *Logic and the Basis of Ethics*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 122. \$1.75.
- RANDALL, J. H., JR., BUCHLER, J., and SHIRK, E. U. *Readings in Philosophy*. New York: Barnes & Noble; June, 1950. \$2.50.
- RING, GEORGE S., S.J. *Religions of the Far East*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; May, 1950. \$4.00 (approx.).
- ROUSSEAU, JEAN JACQUES. *The Social Contract and Discourses*. New American edition of "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; March, 1950. \$1.25.
- SABINE, W. H. W. *Second Sight in Daily Life*. New York: Coward-McCann; Feb., 1950. Pp. 208. \$3.00.
- SCHMALHAUSEN, IVAN. *Factors of Evolution. The Theory of Stabilizing Selection*. Translated from the Russian by Isadore Dordick. Philadelphia: Blakiston Co., 1949. Pp. 341. \$6.00.
- SEARS, PAUL B. *Charles Darwin: The Naturalist as a Cultural Force*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Feb., 1950. \$2.00.
- SHARP, FRANK CHAPMAN. *Good Will and Ill Will. A Study of Moral Judgments*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; April, 1950. Pp. 310. \$5.00.
- SIEVERS, ALLEN MORRIS. *Has Market Capitalism Collapsed? A Critique of Karl Polanyi's New Economics*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 387. \$4.75.
- SMITH, MORTIMER. *And Madly Teach. A Layman Looks at Public School Education*. With an introduction by Bernard Iddings Bell. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949. Pp. x + 107. \$2.00.
- This is a popular essay on the dominant trends of modern education and on the philosophical bases of the theories and practices which can so be designated. Sincere, frequently penetrating, but never heavy, this little book deserves a wide hearing.
- SPINOZA, BENEDICT. *Ethics*. Edited by James Gutmann. Translated by William Hale White. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1949. Pp. 330. \$2.50; paper, \$1.25.
- STANDEN, ANTHONY. *Science Is a Sacred Cow*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., March, 1950. \$2.75.
- STEINER, RUDOLF. *Oswald Spengler, Prophet of World Chaos*. Translated by Norman Macbeth and Frances E. Dawson. New York: Anthroposophic Press, 1949. Pp. 70. Paper, \$1.10.
- STONE, JULIUS. *The Province and Function of Law*. American edition. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; June, 1950. Pp. lxiv + 918. \$10.00.
- TAYLOR, F. SHERWOOD. *Concerning Science*. New York: Macmillan Co. \$1.50.
- Under God and the Law*. Papers read to the Thomas More Society of London. (2nd series). Westminster: Newman Press, 1949. Pp. 199. \$2.50.
- UNESCO's *Homage on the Occasion of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of Goethe's Birth*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 196. Paper, \$1.50.
- Upanishads, The. Translated by Swami Pradhada-nanda and Frederick Manchester. Boston: Beacon Press; March, 1950. Pp. 210. \$2.50.
- VON HILDENBRAND, DIETRICH. *Fundamental Moral Attitudes*. Translated by Alice M. Jourdain. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 72. \$1.75.

The attitudes which are basic to a truly moral life are here discussed eloquently and simply, popularly even, but still profoundly. These basic attitudes—reverence, faithfulness (or constancy), awareness of responsibility, veracity, and goodness—are the subjects of successive chapters. The book is recommended reading for all who are deeply concerned about knowing of, or living, a morally good life.

WEISS, PAUL. *Man's Freedom*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; April, 1950. \$5.00.

WILK, KURT (tr.). *The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin*. Introduction by Edwin W. Patterson. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; March, 1950. \$7.50.

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